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IN TRO DU CTIO N

Theoretical Background

A structure that is commonly adopted by developing nations for
various political purposes is the party.

Political parties are

often defined as structures that perform the functions of interest
aggregation and articulation, and are instrumental in the processes
of political socialization and recruitment.^

As parties are common

to a variety of systems, many classifications of parties have been
made, however,

for the present purposes those of been made, however,

for the present purposes those of Duverger are most applicable.

2

Duverger has distinguished between pluralistic party systems w h e r e at
least two parties coexist wit h none having an extreme superiority
3
over the others and one-party systems.

Duverger used the t erm do

minant-party to describe a deviation of the one-party system wh e r e a
party controls the government through competitive elections over a
long period of time, but must face the criticism of the opposition.

"''See Gabriel Almond and G. B i ngham Powell, Comparative P o l i t i c s :
A Developmental Approach (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1966).

2
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York):
Wiley, 1954)
and Party Politics and Pressure Groups (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1972).
Another useful analysis is provided b y Samuel
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven:
Yale
University Press, 1968):
Huntington claims that instability and
violence, are caused by rapid social mobilization and slow institu
tionalization.
The primary institution to prevent instability is
the party (p. 4).
3
Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups, pp. 19-23.

1
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2

A party is termed dominant if it satisfies two conditions:

"(1)

it

must clearly outdistance its rivals over an extended period of time
(even if occasionally sustaining an electoral defeat);

(2) it must

4
identify with the nation as a whole."
While Duverger claims that even in dominant-party systems op
positions will exist, Dahl offers an argument that attempts to explain
w h y oppositions exist and how they differ from system to system."*
Dahl claims that people have differing beliefs with respect to the
proper conduct of government.

Political preferences vary to such a

degree that the differences between beliefs tend toward diversity
rather than bipolarity.

For the system to exist for any length of

time, it is necessary to develop some type of political means of de
ciding to which of these preferences the government wil l respond.
This results in two basic forms of government termed hegemony and
egalitarian democracy.

Regardless of the particular form of system,

there will exist members of the system who are in disagreement with
the government and the group to whose preferences the government is

^loc. c i t . , p. 36.
See also Duverger, Political P a r t i e s , p. 308.
Huntington claims that the two-party system is the most effective and
stable as a one-party system does not provide competition and alter
natives.
A dominant system must b e responsive to the opposition
since even though the opposition does not have the capacity to govern,
it can affect the political process.
A one-party dominant system is
also capable of producing lengthy periods of political stability,
since inter-party competition exists and the dominant party leaders
must minimize losses (p. 412-428).
^Robert Dahl, Regimes and Oppositions
University Press, 1973).

(New Haven:

Yale
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responding.

Therefore, systems vary through the obstructions and

availabilities that the system provides for "the expression, organi
zation, and representation of political preferences and thus in the
opportunities available to potential oppositions."^
In K o r e a :

The Politics of the Vortex Henderson provides a dif

ferent emphasis on the origin and purpose of opposition.

Henderson

claims that in a highly centralized, homogeneous society like Korea
a strong,

"upward-sucking force" affecting the entire culture exists.

This force acts in such a manner as to "detach particles from any in
tegrative groups that the society might tend to build, social classes,
political parties,

and other intermediary groups,

thus eroding group

consolidation and forming a general atomized upward mobility."^

This

vortex, as Henderson termed it, also affects the development of the
legal system and other formalized procedures and specialized functions
in the society,

thus causing some aspects of Korean society to be

more developed and modernized than other areas.
Henderson further claims that the problems of obtaining power
created by the vortex lead to the creation of broad-surface access
w h i c h functions as a means to absorb the maximum number of aspirants
to power positions.

Since the homogeneous society of Korea is "lack

ing such natural cleavages of issues, color, religion, or culture,

6
loc. cit., pp.

1-2.

7
Gregory Henderson, K o r e a : The Politics of the Vortex
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1968) p. 193.
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such needs for access produce artificial fissures on the broad sur
face of government and contention for it via a series of rival aspir
ant councils —

battling over issues generated by contrived hostility

and verbal acerbity rather than by belief or vested interest."

8

Thus

Hunderson contends that Korean political opposition is due to the
power aspirations that may be realized only by contrived opposition
because of the effect of the vortex.

In other words,

"rivals compete

for the same object in the same way without the possibility of nego9
tiated settlement."

Briefly, Henderson's proposed solution to this

dilemma is a program of decentralization that wo u l d assist in creat
ing local autonomy which in turn would create local political per
sonalities and issues to be used as the basis for alternative party
platforms.
Since 1967 there has been an increasing number of studies in
volving individual South Korean political parties and the party system
as a whole.

These works can be categorized into three bro a d areas

of concern.

There has been interest given to the political role that

the military has played since the coup in 1961.

The foremost works

10
in this area, written by C. I. Eugene K i m

, give an in-depth review

8
loc. cit., p. 194.
9
ibid.

10

C. I. Eugene Kim, 'The Military Regime of South Korea:
The
Past Performance and Future Prospects," paper presented a t the 1973
Annual Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Arm e d Forces and
Society, October 11-13, 1973, and "The Military in the Politics of
South Korea:
Creating Political Order," in Morris Janowitz and
Jacques Van Doorn, eds., On Military Intervention (Rotterdam Univer
sity Press, 1971)
pp. 361-368.
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of the forces that interacted in creating and determining the style of
the military junta.

The military leaders earnestly sought to create

viable m o d e m political institutions in the beginning of their inter
vention.

However, as Park,

the junta leader, and his close supporters

became "civilian" politicians, party systems and other facets of the
development of institutions were subordinated to the continuation of
the regime and its revolutionary goals.

In many ways the Korean case

readily demonstrates the problem encountered by a political system
once the military has intervened in its normal functioning.
The second area, and clearly the most frequent approach used by
researchers,

is viewing party politics in Korea in terms of electoral

competition.^

Y. C. Han has contended that the only function of the

dominant party in Korea was as a device to give formalization to the
nomination of the presidential and National Assembly candidates.
Elections are basically self-perpetuating devices intended to continue

The most significant articles in this area include:
Y. C.
Han, "Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea,"
Pacific A f f a i r s , 42(4), 1969, pp. 446-464 and "The 1969 Constitu
tional Revision and Party Politics in South Korea," Pacific A f f a i r s ,
44(2), 1971, pp. 242-258.
C. I. Eugene Kim, "Patterns in the 1967
Korean Elections," Pacific A f f a i r s , 41(1), 1968, pp. 60-70 and "The
Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elections:
A Pattern of Political Deve
lopment," Asian Survey, 12(3), 1972, pp. 213-224.
Young Whan Kihl,
e d s ., Aspects of Electoral and Party Politics in Korea, Korean Re
search and Publication Series, Research Institute on Korean Affairs,
forthcoming.
See also Young Whan Kihl, "Urban Political Competition
and the Allocation of National Resources," Asian S u r v e y , 13(4), 1973.
Chae-jin Lee, "South Korea:
Political Competition and Government
Adaptation," Asian Survey, 12(1), 1972, pp. 38-45.
Soon Song Cho,
"Korea:
Election Year," .Asian S u r v e y , 8(1), 1968, pp. 29-42.
Also
Kyung-su Kim, "Political Parties and Party Politics in Korea", Korea
J o u r n a l , 7(6), 1967, pp. 4-9.
Yong-bok Ko, "Political Parties and
Factionalism in Korea", Korea J o u r n a l , 7(6), 1967, pp. 10-21.
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the ruling party's dominance.

The institutions of Korea show no

indication of any ability for leadership succession or absorption of
new social forces.

The opposition wil l only be able to win govern

mental control if internal party reforms are carried out as well as a
reduction of external obstacles placed in the system by the dominant
party.

Ki m claims in "Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections" that

the power of the DRP

(Democratic Republican Party)

is due to the or

ganizational strength of the party wh i c h has structures down to the
village level.

The NDP

(New Democratic Party),

on the other hand,

has relatively w e a k structures resulting in mi n o r party status and
giving the system the characterization of being a "one-and-less-thanhalf" party system.

Kihl found in "Leadership and Opposition Role

Perceptions Among Party Elites" that the ruling party elites are
more inclined to support stronger leadership roles, more negative in
their view of the opposition, and look upon the role of the opposi
tion with disfavor.

Kim's analysis of the 1971 elections shows a

rejection of the Park regime by the Korean voters w i thout actually
rejecting President Park.

This occurred through denial of re-elec

tion to a number of DRP Assembly candidates.

K i m interprets this as

an indication of the growing political awareness and capability of
the Korean electorate.
The final area of consideration takes the position of viewing
parties through studies of voter performance and voter support of
parties.

12

12

Kim, Kihl and Chung in their voter turnout study deter-

See C. I. Eugene Kim, Young W h a n Kihl, and Doock-hyou Chung,
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min e d that urban voters tend to turn out less than rural voters due to
low turnout rates among the young and highly educated.

This is caused

by low interest among the young and alienation among the educated.
The same authors in "Political Campaign and the Candidate Selection
of Korean Voters" found that there is a low level of partisanship in
Korea such that only one out of five voters use the party as the sole
means of determining their vote.
urban areas than in rural.

Partisanship tends to be higher in

The main sources of information on po

litics and campaigns generally is through primary sources

(family,

friends, neighbors) and then mass media, campaign speeches, election
w orkers and local officials.

The Korean partisanship and information

gathering indicates a low level of party institutionalization since
the functions of aggregation and articulation tend to be neglected.
However, Li-mun Cho and Kyung-woo Yun found that a great majority of
the Korean people believe that parties are useful and perform valuable
functions in the system.

Basic Objectives

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role performed by
the major opposition party in a one-party dominant system such as the
Republic of Korea.

It is often assumed that the opposition party

"Voter Turnout and the Meaning of Election in South Korea," Asi a n
S u r v e y , 13(11), 1973, pp. 1062-1974, and "Political Campaign and the
Candidate Selection of Korean Voters," unpublished manuscript.
Il-mun
Cho and Kyung-woo Yun, "Popular Perception of Political Parties", and
Jae-on Kim and B. C. Koh, "Regionalism and Voter Alignment," both in
K i m and K i h l , e d s ., Aspects of Electoral and Party Politics in K o r e a .
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offers an alternative to the dominant party either on an ideological
or practical policy basis.

It has been claimed that a dominant party

also tends to coopt the opposition party by dominating both issues
and supporters of the opposition party.

13

Oppositions that have re

mained outside of the government for any length of time tend to be
come violent and over reactive, and elections tend to lose meaning
j rr
14
and effectiveness.
In order to examine the relevance of these and other observations
in a specific occurance, the case of South Korea will be used.

South

Korea clearly fits the category of a one-party dominant s y s t e m ^ with
the DRP in power since its origin in 1963 and the NDP existing as the
major opposition since its inception in 1967.

To determine the nature

of party politics and opposition in Korea an analysis of attitudinal
differences between the elites of the two major parties will be per
formed.
The crises and pressures created by the development process tend
to create groups in the society who disagree w i t h the conduct of the
government and offer alternative plans for nation-building.

Thus in

the Korean case, it is hypothesized that the political opposition
offers the populace an alternative government and although cultural

13
14

Huntington, p. 429.
Duverger, Political P a r t i e s , p. 417.

^ H u n t i n g t o n , p. 421.
See also Arthur S. Banks and Robert B.
Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey , (Cambridge:
M. I. T. Press, 1963)
and Fred R. von den Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations,
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J . : Prentice-Hall, 1969).
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values and beliefs would tend to be consistent between opposing groups,
attitudes toward various political topics would vary to some extent
in reflecting the differing views on government conduct and politics
in general.

The attitudes of a sample of DRP and NDP party cadres on

five broad categories of political phenomena (conflict resolution,
leadership, local or national orientation, participation, and social
justice and equality) will be compared in order to determine if dif
ferences actually exist.

The hypothesized relationship is that si

gnificant differences will occur between the DRP and NDP cadres with
respect to their responses to statements designed to elicit attitudes
on political topics.
If this is the case it will then be necessary to determine furt
her qualifications of the differences.

One readily available dif

ferentiation of these elites are into military and non-military
oriented groups.

As the DRP was created on the initiative of the

military coup leaders and a conscious attempt was made to recruit
party elites from the military among other professions,
in each party can be divided and responses compared.

the elites

Although it

would be interesting to examine the sets of political attitudes held
by military oriented and non-military oriented elites regardless of
party,

that is beyond the scope of this p a p e r . ^

However, it is

possible to determine whether those respondents with a military
orientation that belong to the DRP differ in attitudinal respects

■^See C. I. Eugene K im and Kenneth Rocco in an article to be
published in the Journal of Korean Affairs.
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from those military oriented elites in the NDP.

In the past the

military has often been conceptualized as an institution with internal
consensus and cohesion resulting in relatively little differentiation
in outlook and opinion.

This would indicate that elites with mili

tary orientations would tend to have similar attitudes regardless of
party affiliation.

On the other hand it may also be true that elites

with military orientations are found in a particular party rather than
another party due to some difference that is attitudinally based.
The responses between those DRP elites sampled with a military
orientation will thus be compared to those responses of NDP elites
with military orientations.
This analysis design wil l permit not only an identification of
any differences that exist between the parties, but will determine
if these patterns are consistent among subgroups of the elites.

An

analysis of additional social background data w i l l attempt to illu
minate any factors that may have had an effect on the attitudes of
these elites regardless of party or military orientation.

Although

there is some controversy over the usefulness of social background
data analysis,

it is evident that it may be useful for the particular

case of characterization of a g r o u p . I n

this case it may b e true

that certain background variables such as occupation or educational
attainment have had a relationship to the adoption of an individual's
political attitudes and beliefs.

Since it is possible that these

Social background studies will b e discussed more fully later
in Chapter 5.
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elites were effected in this manner a select social background analy
sis wil l be used to further characterize differences discovered.

The Data and Analytic Methods

The data used in this study was collected in the summer of 1972
by Professors Young Whan Kihl and C. I. Eugene Kim and consists of
271 DRP and NDP elites.

18

The samples wer e obtained from the central

headquarters of each party, provincial headquarters in the Yo n g n a m
and Honam regions in the southern part of the Republic of Korea,
Seoul City district and other urban and rural electoral districts.
The samples were originally drawn in order to obtain a representative
sampling not only for each district but for the rural and urban population residing within each district.

19

For the purpose of this survey party elites w e r e . defined as those
individuals occupying within the hierarchial party structure formal
positions of responsibility.

Ordinary card carrying party members

and those w h o pay dues to the party were not included.
types of elites were included in the survey:
central headquarters of the party;

Three basic

1) party cadres of the

2) electoral district party chair

men and their deputies; and 3) local party representatives or ward
chiefs.

I am deeply appreciative for the use of this data of Professors
Kihl and Kim.
19

See Young Wh a n Kihl, "Leadership and Opposition Role Pe r c e p 
tion Am ong Party Elites,: for further descriptions of the-sample and
techniques used in its collection.
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For the primary analysis the elites wer e divided along party
lines.

To operationalize the military and non-military orientation

dichotomy,

the elites of each party wer e divided according to a per-

sonalized belief obtained from a questionnaire response.

20

Military

experience obviously affects certain individuals more than others
and military service often exerts repercussions once the individual
returns to civilian life.

Party elites w h o responded to the question

"in achieving your present status within the party, to what extent
has military service been responsible in your opinion?" with "very
important" or "important" were classified as military oriented.

These

elites believed that for some reason the fact that they had military
experience had advanced their chances of achieving status wi t h i n the
party.

Similarly,

those who responded wit h "not important" were

classified as non-military oriented as these elites regarded their
military service or lack of service as having no effect on their
party status.

20
It was previously determined that 57% of the sample had served
in the armed forces.
Of this 57% approximately 95% had served in the
army w i t h the remaining 5% belonging to either the navy, air force,
or marine corps.
Furthermore, of those elites who had experienced
military service, 17% had reached officer status at the time of de
parture from the military; the remainder w e r e enlisted men.
It was
also determined that 70% of the elites that had military experience
served for three years or less, as would be expected since the
majority of elites served as enlisted men.
40% of the respondents
we r e born between the years of 1925 and 1934 making them a primary
group for induction into the military during the Korean War period.
Another 40% wer e b o m after 1935.
Thus the general profile of these
elites wi t h respect to their military status is that while a slight
majority had served in the military most of t hem w e r e non-officers in
the army presumably as young draftees.
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The survey design included a number of Likert-type questionnaire
items

21

in order to obtain the extent of agreement or disagreement

with a given statement.

Due to measurement difficulties resulting

from an ordinal scale of the type used that includes strongly agree,
agree, disagree, and strongly disagree response categories, the
responses to the statements used in this analysis wer e collapsed to
form two nominal scales involving either a response in agreement or
in disagreement with the statement.

This allows for the use of the

simple chi-square statistic in the two-by-two case.
The chi-square test is used to evaluate whether empirically ob
tained frequencies differ from frequencies that would be expected
from a predetermined theoretical distribution.

It can, therefore, be

used to test hypotheses" concerning the significance of the difference
of the responses of two or more groups to a stimulus of one type or
another."

22

In this case, as a test of independence, contingency

tables are formed with a null hypothesis of no relationship.

The

larger the difference between the observed and expected frequencies,
the larger the chi-square value.

A sufficiently large value w i l l en

able the rejection of the null hypothesis of no difference.

In the

These statements were of the type found in Philip E. Jacob,
e d . , Values and the Active Co m m u n i t y : A Cross National Study of the
Influence of Local Leadership, (Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1971).

22

N. M. Downie and R. W. Heath, Basic Statistical M e t h o d s , (New
York:
Harper & Row, 1970), p. 197.
See also Hubert M. Blalock,
Social Statistics, (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 275-287.
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two-by-two case a procedure called Y a t e ’s correction for continuity
is used.

This correction is needed in cases where any expected fre

quency is small.

However,

it is often used in any situation where

there is one degree of freedom.

This correction is used since the

chi-square distribution is discrete while the calculation and use of
formulas result in a continuous probability model.

23

23
Downie and Heath, p. 202.
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CHAPTER 1

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA:

A N UNCERTAIN BEGINNING

The military has been in control of South Korean politics since
the May 1961 coup which was led by President Park Chung-hee, then
brigader general, and a group of young officers in the powerful South
Korean Armed Forces.

The coup was not a sudden incident.

carefully planned and executed.

It was

The coup was the result of a cumula

tive development of events that had marked the uncertain beginnings
of the Republic of Korea as a newly independent state.

The purpose

here is to examine this series of events that culminated in a military
takeover of government and irreversibly changed Korean politics.
The coup initiated another set of occurrances that have immediate
bearing on the type of party politics common to Korea.

The leaders

of the coup were interested in solving the causes of the failures of
previous governments, and one of these areas of concern was the condi
tion of party politics.
Korean democracy started w i t h a number of adverse political cir
cumstances beginning with the division of the country into two hos
tile political entities.

Although hopes of rapid unification per

sisted, wa r placed further strains on the South Korean government.
The division and the Korean War also posed serious problems for the
economy as economic development had been stifled under Japanese
colonial rule and the division upset the traditional balance between
the northern and southern production.

15
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The years following the war were characterized by inexperienced
and ineffective government.

The leadership that existed was of an

authoritarian nature and dominated the political system through execu
tive positions.

The primary leadership force,

Syngman Rhee, based

his continued authority in part on the threatened invasion from the
north.
In April 1 96 0, the unrest culminated in student demonstrations
forcing Rhee's government to resign.

At this point the military po

tentially could have protected Rhee's government but instead remained
uninvolved thus giving indirect acceptance of the student demonstra
tors.

The Rhee government was then followed by the short-lived Chang

government of the Second Republic of Korea.

The 1961 military coup

overthrew this Second Republic.
The military had developed into a sufficiently modern institution
that had no match in Korean society."*"
state,

Irrespective of its modernized

the military developed internal dissension over the promotion

system.

Following the rapid army expansion in the first half of the

1950's,

the military began to think of reduction in size, an act that

would obviously affect many of the younger field grade officers.
These younger officers saw promotion to a higher rank "blocked by

1
The tendency of developing societies to have mod e r n military
institutions based on models from industrialized Western societies
has often been documented.
For example, see Lucian Pye, "Armies in
the Process of Political Modernization," in Jason Finkle and Richard
Gable, Political Development and Social C h a n g e , (New York:
Wiley,
1971) pp. 277-283.
It has also been claimed that in acting as a
modernizing agent, the military is prone to intervention.
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men often only two or three years senior, less rigorously selected,
sometimes less w e l l trained, often inferior in higher education,

fre

quently without more experien c e . .. many of them seniors had sacrificed
their moral prestige by corruption and factionalism.

The younger

officers expressed their dissatisfaction in idealistic, developmental,
o

'save-the-society' terms."
The rapid growth and technological modernization of the military
following the Korean War coupled wi t h a class of dissatisfied offi
cers due to the current political difficulties and the lack of promo
tion opportunities created an unstable and potentially dangerous
political situation.

On May 16, 1961 the army successfully over

threw the Second Republic.

The coup, although formally headed by the

Army Chief of Staff, Lt. General Chang Do-young, was engineered by
General Park Chung-hee and Lt. Colonel K i m Jong-p'il and was partici3

pated in by some 3500 men with a core of 250 officers.
lowing day the Military Revolutionary Committee

The fol

(MRC) was formed and

promptly suspended party politics, dissolved the National Assembly
and all local administrations, exerted control over all branches of
government, established price controls, and initiated martial law
including a ban on all demonstrations.

The MRC issued a proclamation

of six oaths or goals that included anti-communism, acceptance of the

2

Gregory Henderson, K o r e a : The Politics of the Vortex
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 356.
\oc.

c i t . , p. 182.
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U. N. Charter and ties wi t h the United States,

the ending of corrup

tion, the creation of a self-supporting economy,

increased morale and

reunification efforts, and a return to civilian government when the
purposes of the revolution had bee n achieved.

The MRC was renamed

the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) on May 19 and
issued Supreme Council Decree No.

6 three days later which disbanded

all political parties and social organizations.

The SCNR passed the

Law Regarding Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction on
June 6 in order to bypass the existing constitution.
massive arrests of politicians,

Meanwhile,

leftists, and non-supporters of the

coup began while other censorship actions wer e initiated; for example,
4
in Seoul 49 out of 64 newspapers were closed.
The Supreme Council was to function as the governing body until
the holding of elections.

The SCNR was comprised of greater than

twenty but less than thirty-two officers wit h a chairman and vicechairman.
formed,

On June 11 the Korean Central Intelligence Agency was

headed by Kim Jong-pil, with the purpose of coordinating and

supervising the activities of the government in information gathering
and investigative matters both of a foreign and domestic nature.

The

formation of the CIA was followed by the Revolutionary Court and
Prosecution La w and the Anti-Communist Law.

These institutions and

laws provided protection against any possible counter-coup and pro
vided further means of controlling opposition.

4
loc.

c i t . , p. 183.
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General Chang was subsequently removed as chairman on July 3
and was arrested on July 8 for counterrevolutionary activities.

Gen

eral Park Chung-hee assumed control of the SCNR and began directing
the governmental policies of the military junta.

Political order was

restored even though mass arrests and purges of governmental minis
tries continued.

The First Five-Year Economic Development Plan was

initiated aiming for a 7.1% annual growth rate and the building of
infrastructures to complement business, agriculture and public works
development.

On August 12, 1961 Park announced the restoration of

civilian government by the middle of 1963.

At the same time Park also

announced plans to prosecute politicians of the First Republic for
election fraud.

Corruption was attacked by the means of a Board of

Inspection that arrested ten former officials.

Ironically, on

September 25 the Board arrested its own investigation team for accept
ing bribes.

The CIA became extremely active in uncovering "communist

plots" that further restricted vocal opposition and temporarily added
to the restoration of political order through forceful means.
On March 6, 1962 the Political Activities Purification Law was
promulgated blacklisting 4,374 individuals for a six year period."*
This law provided a Political Purification Committee appointed by
the SCNR chairman from the Council members that would act as a
screening body for all individuals that had been placed on the list
and had subsequently appealed the decision.

"*K. C. Chung, Kor e a :
millian, 1971) p. 36.

During this period of

The Third R e p u b l i c , (New York:

Mac-
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political inactivity, Park and his followers began preparations for
the lifting of the political ban set for the following year.

The

SCNR formed a constitutional deliberation committee on July 11, 1962
to determine amendments to the constitution.

The results of the work

by this committee were accepted by the SCNR and w e r e then adopted in
a national referendum in December in the form of an amended Second
Republic Constitution.

Kim Jong-pil initiated the formulation of the

plans for a civilian political party to represent the military's
revolutionary interests in the forthcoming elections.
On August 30, 1963 Park resigned from the military and joined
this party,
election.

the DRP, as its presidential nominee for the October 15
The results of this election showed that although 53% of

the voters voted for the opposition candidates Park won w i t h 46.5%.
The major opposition candidate, Yun Po-sun polled 45% of the votes
cast.

The failure of the opposition was due to both its internal

inability to unite and external factors unable to be controlled.

The

factionalism and disunity gave an impression of being unable to offer
a viable,

alternative government; however, some of this disunity may

have been created by CIA agents that had infiltrated opposition
0
parties.

Externally,

the DRP had advance knowledge of the lifting

of the political activities ba n and had more time and finances for
organizing.

The DRP also had the advantage of having none of its

leaders blacklisted by the junta.

^Henderson, p. 187.
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The National Assembly elections were held on November 26 re
sulting in a majority for the DRP.

Public interest had declined and

the Assembly was merely a consultative organ which affected the turn
out.

Nevertheless,

the DRP won 110 out of 175 seats while collecting

only 32% of the vote.

Of the 110 seats 88 had been w o n directly while

22 were appropriated on the basis of proportional representation.
The Civil Rule Party w o n a total of 41 seats,

the Demoncratic Party

w o n 13, Liberal Democratic Party elected nine and the Party of the
People elected two assemblymen.

The DRP effectively used the disunity

of the opposition by running only one candidate per district while
the total opposition often ran as many as six candidates.
Following the 1963 elections party politics and democracy were
on trial for the third time in as many Korean Republics.

The Third

Republic w i t h a highly organized ruling party, a powerful constitu
tional executive and with a functioning, although disorganized op
position apparently had some potential for creating an effective de
mocratic system in Korea.

It is the Third Republic that initiated

Park Chung-hee's experiment in civilian government.

It is also the

Third Republic that saw the attempts and results of the military
legitimization of political power primarily through the development
of the Democratic Republican Party.

The events of post-liberation

Korea that culminated in a military coup provide the background for
the proposed political solutions of the n e w government.

Subsequently,

it is necessary to examine the origin and structure of the DRP as
w ell as that of the Third Republic in order to understand the nature
of political orientation differences in Korea.
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CHAPTER 2

THE DRP AND THIRD REPUBLIC OF KOREA

In 1963 the DRP and the Third Republic were established by the
military coup leaders.

Military organizations that have intervened

in politics as in Korea and other developing nations, often have
created political order.

Huntington claims that this "effectiveness

of military intervention stems at least as much from the organiza
tional characteristics of the military as from its control or use of
1
violence."

Military regimes not only create order but also tend to

be successful in promoting modernization and economic progress.

2

It is more difficult to maintain order without the continued use or
threat of violence and to create a system that is not only developed
economically but also politically and socially.

This requires that

effective political institutions and procedures be established.
Huntington states that in general the institutional needs common
to these situations are threefold.

First,

institutions are needed

that are representative of the "distribution of power" but can still
be able "to attract and to assimilate new social forces."

Second,

institutions are needed to balance the disparity of effectiveness

1
Haven:

Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies
Yale University Press, 1968), p. 239.

(New

2
Amos Perimutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian
Army:
Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing
Polities," Comparative Poli t i c s , I, (April 1969), pp. 382-404.
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between the bureaucratic or output agencies and the input agencies.
Third,

institutions are needed that w i l l allow for the peaceful trans3

fer of power without a recurrence of violence or intervention.
The political institution best suited to address these three needs
is the political party.

Military leaders are often hesitant, however,

to create partisan organizations and are more likely to establish
4
apolitical, non-partisan structures.
Perimutter takes the position that the only successful case
of a military establishing a viable political party system can be
used as a model.

The success of A taturk and the Turkish military

followed five steps.

The military "(1) took the primary role in

selecting a system for government for the country;

(2) chose their

allies from among civilian politicians and from the civil services;
(3) became the source of revolutionary change...;
own

'civilian'

political party; and

(4) formed their

(5) institutionalized the ...

tradition that the army in the barracks must serve as the protector
of civilian rule."'*

As Perimutter is aware many military regimes

have accomplished the first three of these steps but have failed
w i t h the final two.
In South Korea, Park Chung-hee and his military junta created
a ne w government, recruited civilian assistance, and proposed a

3
Huntington, pp. 244-245.
4
loc. cit., p. 245.
^Perimutter, p. 324.
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f ’lmber of revolutionary goals.
modern,

The coup leaders also created a

civilian political party.

This chapter will examine the

processes used in the formation of the DRP and the Third Republic
as well as the particular structures and institutions that we r e de
veloped.
Following Park Chung-hee's announcement in August 1961 that
civilian control of the government would be restored, Kim Jong-pil
and a group of his followers began to construct the DRP.

Several

factors had convinced the junta who were considering political al
ternatives to continued military rule to create their own civilian
party.

The military was fearful of retributions made by any retro

active law that could be enacted by a civilian government concerning
the illegal military takeover.

The military coup leaders could not

work with the politicians of the former governments as the coup was
initiated in part by the perceptions of the poli t i c i an s ’ inabilities.
The military was concerned over the act of relinquishing the political
power that it now controlled.

The revolutionary goals had not been

achieved and the junta felt that its leadership and direction was
necessary for the success of these goals.

With these factors in mind,

the coup leaders constructed a political party to promote their in
terests and to develop a basis of popular support for a continuation
of their rule.

In this respect the DRP has claimed to be the logical

development of the military regime devoted to the goals of moderniza
tion, political stability and economic prosperity.
Prior to the restoration announcement K i m Jong-pil and his CIA
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group** had been involved in the preparation of the alternatives.

It

was determined that the formation of a legal party representing the
basic interests of the junta would allow not only a cooperation of
civilian leaders and a consolidation of power but w o u l d also tend to
remove labels of "military" government from any administration that
the coup leaders would be involved in.

The CIA group began the party

building process by organizing a party center that was drawn from
civilians after CIA screening.

The initial recruits then expanded

the membership through a similar process until a group of approximate
ly 70 party members had been recruited by the end of March 1962.
though some old politicians had been included,

Al

the major emphasis was

placed on recruiting from the young civil service employees, pro
fessors and journalists.
The restrictions on political activity in the form of the Poli
tical Activities Purification Law ended in January 1963.

This law,

adopted in March of the previous year, had banned all political
actions of many politicians.
law,

By the time of the revocation of the

the basic preparatory work on the DRP had been completed by

Kim's group.

The secretary-general of the Central Secretariat,

provisional party heads and the officials of all district party
7
branches were appointed b y January 27.

For CIA involvement in the DRP formation see Gregory Henderson,
K o r e a : The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass,:
Harvard Uni
versity Press, 1968)
pp. 305-308 and 186-187.
7
C. I. Eugene Kimm, "The Military in the Politics of South Korea:
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Prior to the official launching of the party in February 1963,
a factional dispute developed within the leadership.

The non-main

stream faction felt that K im Jong-pil's influence on the direction of
the party formation would weaken their position within the junta
command.

This group was primarily opposed to the party secretariat

organization that Kim and his mainstream faction proposed.

Kim was

allegedly involved in a series of scandals, and he resigned his posi
tions leaving the country in a self-imposed exile from late February
to October 1963.
The structural disputes continued, however,

and following the

1963 elections the non-mainstream faction demanded the abolition of
the secretariat organization.

In February 1965 the two factions

reached an agreement by which the party charter wou l d be revised.

The

revisions would create a more decentralized power structure and would
establish a collective style "leadership by diffusing the highly
centralized power in the hands of the central Secretariat among var-

g
ious non-organizational sectors of the party."

The effect of this

action was the strengthening of the non-mainstream's intraparty power
by weakening the mainstream power center,

the Secretariat.

Creating Political Order," in Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn,
eds., On Military Intervention (Rotterdam University Press, 1971) p.
11.
The Secretary-General, nine provincial chiefs and two special
city chiefs-Seoul and Pusan-were appointed on January 21 w h i l e the
leaders and officers of 131 district party branches were appointed on
January 27.

8
Kwan Bong Kim, Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of
the Korean Political System (New York:
Praeger, 1971) p. 183.
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The DRP was created through initiative from above w i t h two
primary causes of the ineffectiveness of previous parties taken into
account.

Korean parties in the past had little organizational con

tinuity, were primarily national organizations with little local con
tacts, and were centered around a select group of politicians.

There

fore, Kim and the CIA group w e r e concerned with the institutionaliza
tion aspects of party-building.

Institutionalization has been defined

by Huntington as the process that creates stability and value in the
9
organizations and procedures of the social or political systems.
Ki m and his mainstream group attempted to achieve this ideal state by
proposing a highly centralized hierarchial party that emphasized dis
cipline and adherence to the party line as determined by the leader
ship.

The party was to be highly complex with extensive local branch

organizations controlled by the central Secretariat or the party ad
ministrative bureaucracy.

This arrangement would permit a single

chain of command facilitating rapid communication and dissemination
of party programs and propaganda.
institution,

In order to be effective as an

the party would also necessarily need to operate effici

ently during off-election years.

Ideally, this would allow a con

tinuous process of interest aggregation,

recruitment of new social

forces, and open input channels from the constituents directly to
party officials.
The second major problem that confronted the party builders

Huntington, p. 12.
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was factionalism.

Although factionalism is partly accountable by a

lack of institutionalization,

this problem tends to be indigenous to

highly centralized, homogeneous societies according to Henderson.
The combination of centralism and homogeneity has resulted in a v o r 
tex or a force which tends to detach members from any integrative
structure in the Korean s o c i e t y . ^

The result of this combination is

such that "since there is little advantage to standing for office as
a member of a group and since grouping as a function has long enjoyed
low Korean prestige, politicians lack group morale or cogent reasons
for remaining united.

The politician feels free to shift allegiance

as he views his chance for access to power a l t e r i n g . T h i s

vortex

pattern has created high mobility and interchangeability resulting
in shifting group alliances and coalitions.

Furthermore, since the

society is homogeneous and lacks natural political cleavages, arti
ficial cleavages are adopted by power aspirants in order to contest
the holders of power.

According to K i m Jong-pil's plans the Secre

tariat would function as the operational center of the party "in
order to check the National Assembly-centered operation that had
marked the operation of the old parties and to prevent the party from
degenerating into a group of factional cliques centered around National Assemblymen."

12

10
See Henderson, p. 193.

11
loc. c i t . , p. 288.

12Kwan

Bong Kim, p. 182.
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The preliminary structure of the DRP was adopted in the form of
an eight-point master plan by the charter committee in January 1963.
This plan proposed an open, mass party with a centrally directed hierarchial leadership that would promote ideological consensus and party
discipline in order to reduce factionalism.

The party would formulate

and implement policies under the internal direction of a party execu
tive structure.

The party would also have the capability for con

tinuous recruitment of new members and would train and educate all
members.^
The actual structure of the DRP as finally accepted consisted of
two parallel organizations controlled by the party President and
Chairman.

The first of these organizations is the committee structure.

In theory the highest governing body of the DRP is the National Party
Convention whose representatives are selected by city and provincial
committees.

The Party Convention selects the Central Committee which

in turn elects the Central Standing Committee, a body of from 300 to
500 members that acts in an advisory capacity on policy proposals.
District Party Committees are formed at the town level and then elect
Provincial Branch Committees.

City Branch Committees are elected
14

directly and retain equal ranking to the provincial level committees.
Ultimate party power is to be found in the positions of Party
President and Party Chairman.

The President is the supervisor and

13
ibid.
14
C. I. Eugene Kim, p. 11.
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director of the party structure.

The Chairman is appointed by the

President w i t h Party Convention approval and serves as the operational
head of the party executive.

All other important party posts are no

minated by the Chairman and approved by the President.

The Chairman

also presides over the Party Council w h i c h determines all serious
party considerations including party nominations for the National
Assembly, finance and budgetary matters, and policy and program formu
lation.
The second organizational structure is the Secretariat.

The cen

tral party Secretariat is under the control of the Director-General
who is supervised by the Chairman.

The Secretariat functions as the

executive or administrative bureaucracy of the party and controls all
local secretariats in the branch offices of the party.

The central

Secretariat has five offices that are concerned with directing, plan
ning, and research, organization, publicity,

training and education,

15
and general affairs.
A final organization that is essential to the functioning of the
DRP is the Policy Committee consisting of fifty members drawn from the

The Secretariat structure w as greatly weakened by two occurances.
The factional dispute between the mainstream and non-main
stream factions resulted in the loss of appointive power by the D i 
rector-General.
Previously, the Director-General could appoint all
local party positions resulting in a structure controlled by a single
figure.
K i m Jong- p i l ’s position as second-in-command of the military
government, head of the CIA and chairman of the charter committee
created difficulties for the anti-Kim faction in the military since he
would wield ultimate authority over the Secretariat also.
The second
occurance was the acceptance of the practice of allowing National
Assemblymen to run the local party branches, thus giving control of
local party affairs to the National Assemblymen and away from the
Secretariat.
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National Assembly, government ministries, and high level party
positions.

The functions of this committee include creating policy,

advising the Party Council, coordinating the government and party po
licies, and supervising two groups of specialists,

the Policy Review

Board and the Policy Research Office.
As the DRP was formed to solve the problems that had plagued
past political parties,

the constitution of the Third Republic was

formed in order to avoid the weaknesses of the Rhee and Chang govern
ments.

Six basic areas,

the executive, judicial and legislative

branches, local government,

civil rights, and party politics, were

affected by the new constitution.

The provisions regarding these

areas not only indicated the orientations of the constitution authors
but characterize the

style of the Par k regime.

In the original

constitution of the Third

Republic, the head of

the executive branch

and chief of state is the

President elected by

popular vote for no more than two

consecutive four year terms.

This

office controls the power .to ratify treaties, declare war, proclaim
martial law, order emergency legislation, and appoint high government
officials.

The President also is the commander of the armed forces,

chief formulator of policy and chief administrator.

Of the presiden

tial agencies controlled by the President the Central Intelligence
Agency has the greatest potential for wielding power as its purposes
include the supervision and coordination of all investigative matters
concerning the government.

Other agencies include the National

Security Council, Economic and Scientific Council, Board of Audit
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Inspection, and the Political Advisory C o u n c i l . ^
The Prime Minister acts as the operational administrator of all
executive ministries.

Besides b e i n g the successor to the President,

the Prime Minister must countersign all presidential laws and nom
inates people to fill executive posts and State Council seats.

The

State Council acts as an advisory group rather than a policy making
organization as all decisions are subject to presidential veto and
all council members hold their positions at the discretion of the
President.^
The National Assembly as the major institution of the legislative
branch has relatively little influence but is protected from presi
dential dissolution.

The Assembly acts on bills w i t h a single m a 

jority except when voting on a vetoed bill or a constitutional amend
ment.

The Assembly must also approve the annual budget submitted by

the executive.
The judiciary branch is given the constitutional power of judicial

The functions of the other presidential agencies are as follows:
The National Security Council advises on policy matters affecting
foreign, domestic, and military concerns; the Economic and Scientific
Council advises on national economy policies and recommends programs;
the Board of Audit and Inspection serves as a controlling devise over
executive spending and activity; and the Political Advisory Council
functions as a policy deliberation forum.
17
The Ministries of the executive are the Economic Planning Board
Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, Justice, National Defense,
Education, Agriculture and Forestry, Commerce and Industry, Construc
tion, Public Health and Social Affairs, Transportation, Communications,
Culture and Public Information, Government Administration, and the
National Unification Board.
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review but the executive retains extensive appointment priviledges.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is a presidential appointee
based on recommendations from the Judge Recommendation Council.
council consists of four judges,

This

two lawyers, one professor of law,

the Minister of Justice, and the Prosecutor General, most of who m are
either directly or indirectly appointed by the President.

"The same

thing can be said of the justices of the Supreme Court who are ap
pointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Council
(Article 99-2); and of the judges w h o are appointed by the Chief
Justice through the decision of the Council of the Supreme Court
18
Justices

(Article 99-3)."

The Judiciary is also composed of three

Appellate Courts and nine District Courts, and administers the Pro
secutor's Office,

the chief conductor of investigations and origina

tor of legal proceedings,

the Impeachment Tribunal, and the police

force.
Due to the highly centralized, unitary system of the Third
Republic,

local self-government is basically undeveloped.

According

to the constitution local governments will b e determined by law when
the proper time arrives.

The mayors of Seoul and Pusan and the

governors of the nine provinces are centrally appointed.

Other local

officials are appointed by the Prime Minister upon the recommendation
of the Minister of Home Affairs.

As the Minister of Home Affairs

Y. C. Pak, "The Third Republic Constitution of Korea, Western
Political Quarterly, 21(1), (March 1968), p. 118.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

theoretically controls all local administrations,
governors, mayors,

the provincial

town and township chiefs act as representatives of

the central government's executive branch in many cases.
Civil rights and freedoms are specifically stated limiting
governmental manipulation.

The clause "as provided by law" provides

an alternative in emergency situations for the executive.

According

to one author the emphasis of the civil rights provisions of the con
stitution facilitates the creation of a welfare state.

The consti

tution stresses the economic and social welfare of the individual
which leads to a modification of individual rights.

The modernizing

nation is concerned with the development of effective economic insti
tutions and social agencies resulting in the tendency to withdraw in
dividual rights to crisis periods.

As the President has the power to

declare martial law, presidential decree may also suspend civil
•
19
liberties.

The constitution guarantees individual political parties and a
plural party system.

However,

"if the purposes or activities of a

political party are contrary to the basic democratic order of the
Constitution,

the Government shall bring an action against it in the

Supreme Court for its dissolution and the political party shall be
dissolved in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court"
(Article 7-3).
seats —

Two methods exist for assigning National Assembly

direct election and proportional representation where one

19
loc. c i t . , p. 121.
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fourth of the seats are to be distributed to political parties on the
basis of votes received in the Assembly elections.
Assembly a person must be nominated by a party.

To run for the

A n Assemblyman loses

his seat if the assemblyman switches parties after the election or if
his party is dissolved.

However,

to protect mergers and internal

criticism, an assemblyman retains his seat if his party combines with
another party or if he is expelled from his party.

The effect of

these provisions is to limit the number of independent politicans
elected to the Assembly while attempting to create institutionalized
patterns in elections where candidates run on more substantial issues
than family and status.

This is further evidenced by the Political

Party Law enacted on December 31, 1962 which requires that each local
chapter has at least fifty members while chapters must be created in
at least one-third of the total number of regional electoral dis-

20
tricts.
This Third Republic Constitution was a calculated effort to ef
fectively deal wi t h the problems of past governments and to accomodate
future administrations.

The result of the constitution and the first

election was in effect, however, a continuation of the military govern
ment through a centrally controlled,

"administrative democracy."

After the 1963 elections while Park's government began the First
Five-Year Economic Development Plan,

the opposition attempted to unify

loc. cit., p. 120.
See the Supreme Council Review, No. 16,
January 1963 for full text of the Political Party Law, Law No.
1246.
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itself in order to effectively campaign against the DRP in the next
elections.

A number of coalitions, mergers, and reorganizations

occurred within the next two years, but these moves were basicially
ineffective.

The hard-line faction led b y Yun Po-sun eventually

split from the moderates in the People's Party in early February 1966
to form the New Korea Party.

As the 1967 elections neared, the opposi

tion again attempted to present a unified, single party to oppose the
DRP.

On February 7, 1967 the New Korea Party and the People's Party

merged to form the New Democratic Party and chose Yu Chin-o as Chair
man and Yun Po-sun as the candidate for the upcoming presidential
elections.
During this period the DRP also suffered from factional disputes
over the influence of Kim Jong-pil and the Korea-Japan normalization
treaty (1965).

The non-mainstream faction forced party charter re

visions in February 1965 that further weakened the K i m faction.
Earlier, on June 5, 1964, Kim was pressured into resigning from his
party positions for the second time due to the treaty crisis.
Although factional disputes occurred wi t h i n the DRP,

the party

withstood the internal pressures and renominated President Park for
his second four-year term.

The May presidential elections resulted

in the not unexpected victory of Park wi t h a 51% to 41% margin over
Yun.

Park had used the record of his past four years and a "moderni

zation of the fatherland" campaign, wh i l e the continuing disunity of
the opposition saw a total of four candidates besides Yun Po-sun
running for the office.
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The National Assembly elections followed in June.

21

The DRP

collected 53% of the vote and won 103 district seats as well as 37
seats assigned from proportional representation, while NDP re
ceived 34% of the vote, or 27 district seats and 17 assigned seats.
While the election proved to be a two party content as only one minor
party candidate was elected, the D R P victory caused two serious re
percussions.

First,

the NDP charged, with some basis,

irregular activities had occurred during the election,

that highly
and demanded

nullification of the elections as wel l as public apologies b y Presi
dent Park.
Assembly.

When these demands failed the NDP boycotted the National
President Park acknowledged the irregularities and acted

by expelling eleven elected party members due to election fraud,
arrested several DRP members, and gave one seat that had bee n w o n by
the DRP to the NDP candidate.

The NDP continued the boycott and the

Assembly opened with no opposition present.

In December a 14-point

compromise was reached that was aimed at amending the election laws.
The second repercussion of the DRP victory was a constitutional
crisis in that the DRP no w held a two-thirds majority in the legis
lature.

The first test of this power occurred in late December when

the DRP passed the annual budget with no debate or questions permitted

ror further information on the 1967 elections see C. I. Eugene
Kim, "Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections,"
Pacific A f f a i r s , 41(1),
(Spring 1968) pp. 60-60, John Kie-Chiang Oh, K o r e a : Democracy on
Trial (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1968)
pp. 175-185, K. C.
Chung, K o r e a : The Third Republic (New York:
MacMillan, 1971), and
Se-Jim Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in K o r e a , (Chapel
Hill:
University of South Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 145-150.
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from the opposition.

The second opportunity involved the constitu

tional amendments of 1969.

The DRP began to talk of possible consti

tutional amendments that would allow a continuation of Park's rule.
In May 1969 the NDP convention again nominated Yu Chin-o as chairman
and resolved to fight any attempted amendments.

The opposition con

tended that there had been no peaceful transfer of power in South
Korean politics and that the drafters of the constitution wer e at
tempting to amend their document only to allow Park to run for a
third term.

Furthermore,

the NDP claimed that continued rule by the

DRP would result in unabated corruption, and that the DRP's economic
development would continue to benefit only a small section of the
society.

22

An internal crisis developed in the DRP as K i m Jong-pil support
ers opposed the amendment.

On April 8, 1969 five K i m supporters were

expelled by the DRP leadership because of a lack of adherence to the
party line.

The amendment was formally announced on August 9 and

consisted of four main revisions:

the President w a s permitted to run

for three consecutive terms; the size of the National Assembly was
increased; a two-thirds majority was needed in the Assembly for an
impeachment motion; and assemblymen could hold executive positions
while being a member of the legislature.

The opposition attempted

to block the speaker's rostrum, but in a parliamentary move the
speaker sent the bill to the Cabinet for thirty day notice.

22

The bill

Chung, p. 57.
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was signed by 108 DRP members, 11 splinter-group assemblymen and
three NDP members; five votes more than the necessary two-thirds ma
jority.
In an effort to block passage of the bill, the NDP and the
Masses Party dissolved themselves in September after expelling all
members except those supporting the amendments.

Constitutionally,

members expelled from a party are permitted to become independents,
while members of a party that is dissolved lose their seats in the
Assembly.

This maneuver reduced the supporters of the amendment by

four votes, but also lowered the required number of votes needed for
passage of the bill to 114.

In a highly unorthodox move,

the bill

was passed during the night by 122 assemblymen in a seldom used
committee room while the entire opposition was waiting for the next
scheduled convening of the Assembly.
The amendment was passed through national referendum on October
17, 1969 with 68% of the voter turnout in support.

In a helpless

gesture the opposition declared a boycott of the Assembly.

President

Park moved in October to strengthen the unity of his party by dis
missing the army Chief of Staff and the Director of the CIA as earlier
demanded by the pro-Kim Jon-pil faction.
The constitutional amendment tended to make the 1971 presidential
election no contest.
Tae-jung,

The NDP candidate, forty-five year old Kim

campaigned strenuously, however, and caused the DRP some

consternation.

K im attacked the corruption of the Park regime, the

unequal economic development, proposed to eliminate the unpopular
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Homeland Reserve Force and forced military training, alleged that
Park's policies only added to the North-South hostilities, and pro
mised reunification efforts and more flexible attitudes toward Com
munist nations.

On the day prior to the election, Park countered

with a statement that the 1971 election would b e his last attempt at
the presidency under the revised Third Republic Constitution.

Park

also claimed during the campaign that no opposition candidate was
capable of being president, and Park's supporters declared that a
victory by the opposition could feasibly cause another military coup.
The election was held on April 27 resulting in a victory by Park with
55% to Kim Tae-jung's 45%.
The National Assembly elections held on May 25 indicated a loss
of power for the DRP.

The final results gave 113 seats out of 204

to the DRP, while the NDP increased their representation to 89 seats.
The DRP suffered somewhat from the necessity to run an election devoid
of irregularities to avoid public outcry, wh i l e the NDP was at its
peak of unity following the campaign of its presidential candidate.
The opposition unity was due to the awareness of the need to gain as
many seats as possible to stop the passage of any future amendments
23
aimed at continuing the rule of Park.
Following the elections each of the major parties faced internal
crises.

Kim Hong-il became chairman of the NDP after the forced

See C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elec
tions:
A Pattern of Political Development," Asian S u r v e y , 12(3),
(March 1972), pp. 213-224.
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resignation of Yu Chin-o following the placing of his own name on
the proportional representation list after claiming that he would
run only in his own Seoul district.

The DRP suffered a purge, the

suspension of four DRP members and the dismissal of two other assem
blymen from the party following a vote defection of at least 18 DRP
assemblymen that resulted in the dismissal of the Minister of Home
Affairs, Oh Chi-song.
In 1972,

the Third Republic was replaced by the Fourth Republic.

Park declared, a state of national emergency on October 17, supposed
ly due to the new situation in international politics initiated by
President Nixon's initiatives to the People's Republic of China.
The eventual result of the state of national emergency was the
"October Renovation" in which the Fourth Republic and its corres
ponding constitution were created allowing Park extensive presiden
tial authority for unlimited six-year terms.
The reign of the DRP during the Third Republic exemplified the
general mistrust of politics and political procedures by the military
revolutionaries.

The party built by the coup leaders can be eva

luated in terms of the criteria of institutionalization as offered
by Huntington.

The DRP tended to be functionally adaptable within

the system as evidenced by its manipulation of institutions such as
the constitution to further its goals.

The DRP, however, did not

experience any generational aging through a change in leadership, and
did not experience a change in representation.
organizational structure,

With an effective

the DRP was institutionalized in terms of
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complexity.

However, effective means of aggregation and articulation

of the constituents’ interests by the party apparatus w er e either not
greatly valued or inadequately developed.

Political institutionali

zation in terms of autonomy is explained as "the development of poli
tical organizations and procedures that are not simply expressions of
the interests of particular social groups."

24

The military coup

leaders effectively directed the interests of the party through do
mination of power positions but did not function as a distinct social
group.

The DRP generally presented unified positions at elections but

suffered from occassional incidences of internal factionalism on party
matters, personality
however,

conflicts, and proposed legislation.

In general,

the DRP was relatively coherent and unified.

The two problems that the founders of the party w e r e concerned
with were only partly solved.
the DRP indicates
of behavior,

The level of institutionalization of

that rather than bei n g a valued,

recurring pattern

the DRP was often used as a manipulative m echanism for

political gain on the national level.

Factionalism w i t h i n the DRP

was controlled to some extent by the structure devised b y the founding
committee.

However, factions did cause the party to be less effective

in developing the functions of a political party such as interest
aggregation, articulation, and recruitment, than was possible con
sidering the DRP's organizational structure and support.
The personal rule of Park Chung-hee was characterized b y his

Huntington, p. 20.
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administrative democracy that tended to overlook political solutions
to political problems.

Park's position was basically that a strong

administration would lead to effective economic development which in
turn would lead to political development.

25

It is evident that Park's

strong administration created substantial economic prosperity, but it
is equally evident that the economic development did not create a
developed political system.

Park, furthermore, has placed the future

of Korea on a position dependent upon his own future.

This type of

perception often leads to authoritarian and unrestricted rule.

Park's

dislike for politicians and parties further hindered the institutiona
lization of the DRP as it developed into a legitimizing mechanism and
a legislative extension of the executive branch.
The military coup leaders definitely played a primary role in
establishing a system of government in Korea.

The Third Republic was

consciously designed with the failures of the past and the needs of the
present in mind.

As the party of the coup leaders was in its initial

stages of formation, selected university professors and professional
politicians were recruited to assist.

University professors and legal

advisers also assisted in the planning of the constitution.

The party

was to be staffed wi t h "a new elite made of young professors, j o u r n a ,.26
lists and civil servants.,..

.

It is clear that the military leaders

25

See Y. C. Ha n "Political Parties and Political Development in
South Korea," Pacific A f f a i r s , 42, (1969), pp. 446-464 and "The 1969
Constitutional Revision and Party Politics in South Korea", Pacific
A f f a i r s , 44(2), (1971), pp, 242-258.
^C.I.
pp.

Eugene Kim, "The Military in the Politics of South Korea,"

3-8.
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chose allies from among civilian politicians and civil servants.
coup was also viewed as a source of revolutionary change.

The

General

Park stated that the coup was necessary in order to create democracy.
"The Military Revolution is not the destruction of democracy in Korea.
Rather it is a way for saving it; it is a surgical operation intended
to exercise a malignant social, political and economic tumor."

27

The DRP was a "civilian" party formed on the initiative of the
coup leaders.

The party proved to function relatively effectively in

the system and has not yet been defeated in an election.

However,

whether or not the military will continue to serve as the guardian of
civil rule is not clear.
The role of the opposition in the Third Republic was ineffective
due to the power of the DRP and the internal factionalism wi t h i n the
opposition ranks.

The DRP commanded the use of the local government

administration and police in turning out supporters, as well as the
use of appropriations and expenditures to gain further support.

The

opposition suffered from contentions that they were unable to govern
the country due to their internal dissension and the lack of any
well-defined alternative governmental plan.

Personal political ex

pediency tended to often direct the opposition parties, and whe n the
paths to power were perceived to be blocked a splinter group was

27

Park Chung-hee, Uri Miniok ui Nagal Kil [Our N a t i o n ’s P a t h ],
(Seoul:
Tong-a C h ’ulp' an-sa, 1972), pp. 197-198 quoted in C. I.
Eugene Kim, "The Military in the Politics of South Korea",
pp. 2-3.
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created to open new paths.

The opposition with limited funds was un

able to create organizations that wou l d permit closer contact wit h the
masses.

This fact in combination with the factional problem tended

to limit the creation of consistent patterns of action and policy
formation.
It is evident, nevertheless,

that the NDP often attempted to

restrict the increasing powers of President Park and his party.

There

were vocal and occasionally violent manifestations of opposition to
the DRP domination of government.

The analysis in the following

chapter will determine whether these apparent party differences are
expressed in the political attitudes, of party elites from the DRP
and NDP.
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CHAPTER 3

THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF PARTY ELITES

The New Democratic Party as the major opposition force since its
inception in February 1967 has not been successful in its attempts
to win a national electoral victory over the dominant Democratic Re
publican Party.

In a relatively homogeneous society such as Korea,

there generally exist few societal issues of a magnitude to create
political parties that are based on different ideologies, while em
phasis on different specific issues is entirely possible.

However,

the NDP organization has persistently run candidates for national and
local positions even though the party has been unable to obtain in
fluence in the government; a situation that seems to be relatively
static in the

near future.

This situation raises a question as to

nature of the

opposition of the NDP.

the

What causes the NDP to continue

to function as an opposition party considering the record of its past
performances and the organizational strength and widespread success of
the DRP?

Do those individuals that join the NDP do so in order to

voice political opinions differing from the DRP position or is it due
to some other

reason and these individuals actually hold opinions

basically the

same as those of the DRP?

Are party elites more in

clined to join a party on the basis of political attitudinal and belief
orientation, or are the reasons less of a political nature and more of
an economic or social status nature?
This analysis hypothesizes that party elites belonging to the

46
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DRP will have different orientations on various political attitudinal
statements than those party elites from the NDP.

The political

socialization, political experience, and eventual adoption of politi
cal values, attitudes and concepts determines the development of
ideologies and specific issue reactions w i t h i n a given individual.
it is true that differences exist betw e en the DRP and NDP elites,

If
then

it would tend to indicate that an individual joins a particular party
in Korea partly due to a correspondence between the political positions
held by the party and the attitudes expressed b y an individual.

The

following analyses are based on our survey data.

Political Participation and Public Trust

Statement

Response

Group
DRP

The extent of political

NDP

awareness of the public

A gree

is low.

Disagree______ 63 (.37)_____ 9 (.09)
Total
X 2 = 22.81

Statement

107 (.63)

88 (.91)

170 (1.0)

(p

0'=

= .001)

Response

97 (1.0)
.30

Group'
DRP

The degree of political

NDP

participation of the

Agree

107 (.64)

83 (.89)

public is low.

Disagree______ 59 (.36)

10 (.11)

Total

93 (1.0)

166 (1.0)

2
X

= 17.50

(p

= .001)

0’=

.27
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Although nearly two-thirds of the DRP elites agree that low
levels of participation and awareness characterize Korean politics,
a significantly higher proportion of NDP elites are in agreement with
these statements than DRP elites.

Nearly nine out of ten NDP elites

agree that low participation and awareness levels exist.

There does

exist some degree of consensus among these elites, however, as a
majority of all elites are in agreement that these two problems facing
many developing polities are also present in Korea.

Statement

Response

The public respect of
political leaders is low.

Group
DRP

Agree

NDP

114 (.70)

78 (.86)

49 (.30)

13 (.14)

Total

163 (1.0)

91 (1.0)

X 2 = 7.04

(p = .01)

Disagree

0'=

.18

As was the case with the two previous statements, a majority of
both DRP and NDP elites agree with the statement that "the public
respect of political leaders is low."

A higher proportion of the NDP

elites than DRP elites agree with the statement.

The NDP as the

opposition party feels strongly that the DRP leadership is not trust
ed by the people.

The responses to these three statements above

signifies a much dimmer view of Korean politics by the NDP, a position
attributable to the N D P Ts opposition status, whi l e the DRP responses
indicate an awareness on the part of these elites that these problems
exis t .
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Statement

Response

Group
DRP

As people trust government their concern about

Agree

public issues also increases.

Disagree

149 (.92)

23

163 (1.0)

2
= 10.68

72 (.76)

14 (.08)

Total
X

NDP

(p = .01)

0'=

(.24)

95 (1.0)
.21

While a majority of all elites agree that the public has low le
vels of respect or trust for political leaders, an even greater pro
portion of all elites agree that "as people trust government their
concern about public issues also increases."

It is curious that while

only slightly under two-thirds of the DRP elites agreed with the pre
vious statements nine out of ten of these same elites agreed that
trust in government leads to increased public interest.

Since public

concern over issues is often manifested by participation, awareness,
and respect,

the DRP responses imply that the DRP elites place empha

sis on trust in government even though it may not currently exist.
Only three-fourths of the NDP elites agree w ith the statement.

One

implication of the form of the statement is that more DRP elites than
NDP elites believe that if people trust government then their con
cern about issues increases, or, in other words,

to generate greater

concern over issues among the general public, it would be beneficial
to increase feelings of trust in the government.
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Response

Statement

Group
DRP

Most decisions should

NDP

52

(.32)

40 (.44)

Disagree

112

(.68)

50 (.56)

Total

164 (1.0)

90 (1.0)

be left to the judge

Agree

ment of experts.

2
X

0 ’ = .13

= 3.55

NDP

DRP

Only those who are

(.54)

51

(.31)

50

Disagree

111

(.69)

43 (.43)

Total

162

(1.0)

93 (1.0)

fully informed on the

Agree

issues should vote.

X2 = 11.35

(p = .001)

0' = .22

While more than two-thirds of the DRP elites reject the position
that "most decisions should be left to the judgement of experts," a
large minority,

greater than forty per cent, of the NDP elites agree

with the statement.

A similar response pattern exists in conjunction

with the statement "only those who are fully informed on the issues
should vote."

In this case nearly seventy per cent of the DRP

elites disagree wit h the statement while a majority of the NDP elites
agree.

On the basis of these two statements there are indications

that the NDP elites tend to be less democratically oriented than the
DRP elites.

The DRP elites readily reject restrictions on the de

cision-making process and the right to vote, while the NDP elites
are rather closely divided over rejecting or accepting restricted de
cision-making and informed voting.

As the NDP believes that partici
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pation and awareness levels of the public are lo w , a n d considering
the past electoral record, it is not unusual that the NDP elites de
sire that uninformed and less knowledgeable voters refrain from voting.
In relation to the previous statements on political participation
and public trust, the DRP is aware of the political problems of low
levels of awareness, participation and trust but is unwilling to
adopt positions that would restrict priviledges.

This pragmatic

response to the acknowledged problems stems not only from the fact
that the DRP candidates have been elected to office under the existing
system, but that the DRP elites have probably become more politically
professional.

On the other hand,

the NDP elites have never been in

power with their party and have relatively low levels of political
expertise in comparison to the DRP.

Therefore, the NDP elites are

less pragmatic and more will i n g to accept restrictive proposals in
order to improve their position.

This is true especially in the case

of informed voting, since an informed voter that is aware of the
issues would be more likely to vote for the NDP's opposition platform
than a voter that is uninformed.
With respect to these above statements,

the two groups agree in

principle but differ in the extent of agreement wi t h i n each group.
That low levels of public participation, awareness, and respect exist
is agreed to by both groups.

However, a sizeable minority of roughly

one-third of the DRP disagrees in each case.

While the DRP elites

soundly reject restricting decision-making and voting priviledges,
the NDP elites tend to be more vacillatory b y agreeing wit h one
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statement and disagreeing with the other b y slight margins.

As both

groups view increasing trust in government as a means of increasing
public concern for politics,

the DRP elites present a response pat

tern that is more logically organized and that indicates a greater
awareness of political interaction as w ell as bei n g of a more politi
cally pragmatic nature.

Conflict R e solution

Response

Statement

Group
DRP

It is desirable in
reaching political

Agree

decisions to recon

Disagree

cile conflicting interests.

Total
X

= 10.95

NDP

145

(.91)

69 (.74)

15

(.09)

24 (.26)

160

(1.0)

93 (1.0)

(p =

.001) 0' = .22

In response to the statement "it is desirable in reaching poli
tical decisions to reconcile conflicting interests," a majority of
both the DRP and NDP elites agree.

However, while nine out of ten

DRP elites approve, only seven out of ten NDP elites are in agreement
with the statement.

Politics in a democratic society is often viewed

1
as a process of resolving conflicts.

The response of the NDP elites

See Gabriel Almond and G. B i n g h a m Powell, Comparative P o l i t i c s :
A Developmental Approach (New York:
Little, Brown, 1966) and Joseph
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, e d s . , Political Parties and Political
Development
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 418.
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again indicates a less democratic position in that nearly thirty per
cent of the NDP elites do not value the resolution of conflicting
interests as a desirable goal in politics.

The DRP elites having

greater political experience and tending to be more pragmatic have
greater support for reconciliation of interests in the decision-making
aspect of political action.

This position of the DRP elites is also

consistent with the widespread support that the previous statement
involving trust in government received.

Belief in attempting to re

concile conflicting interests in decision-making and desiring in
creased trust in government to increase public concern are compatible
positions.

It is interesting that the responses to this statement

also reflect further indications of the more democratic orientation
of the DRP elites in comparison to the elites of the NDP.

National or Local Orientation

Statement

Response

Group
DRP

In case of conflict

NDP

the needs of the local

Agree

87 (.53)

57 (.63)

community take precedence

Disagree_______ 77 (.47)

34 (.37)

over national concern.

Total

91 (1.0)

X

2

=

164 (1.0)
1.82

0'

= .09

Although a majority of both groups agree that "in case of con
flicts the needs of the local community take precedence over national
concern," there exists some degree of intra-party disagreement as to
whether national or local concerns are more important, especially in
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the DRP.

In this case there are no differences between the elites,

although the NDP elites display a tendency to be more in favor of
local needs in cases of conflict of interest.

Statement

Response

Group
DRP

When in doubt, local

NDP

leaders should decide

Agree

115

(.70)

50 (.60)

in favor of national

Disagree_________ 49

(.30)

34 (.40)

government objectives.

Total

(1.0)

84 (1.0)

164

2
X

= 2.35

0' =

.11

As was the case in the previous statement, a m a j ority of both
groups of elites agree that "when in doubt, local leaders should de
cide in favor of national government objectives."

While the NDP

pattern of response remains similar to the response to the previous
statement dealing with national or local orientation,
much more readily accepted this statement.

the DRP elites

A higher proportion of

DRP elites accept national government objectives w h e n doubt exists
as to the proper course of action to be taken than w h e n a situation
of conflict exists with local priorities.

Statement

Response

Group
DRP

Local leaders should
follow the demands and

Agree

expectations of the local

Disagree

public and not act inde

Total

pendently.

X 2 = 0.50

143

NDP

(.87)

79 (.83)

21 (.13)

16 (.17)

163 (1.0)
0' =

95
.06
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Nearly nine out of ten elites regardless of party agree that
"local leaders should follow the demands and expectations of the local
public and not act independently."

The response to this statement in

dicates that leaders are to be accountable to the public that they
serve and should not be independent from them in making decisions.

The

high rate of agreement and the lack of differentiation between the
two groups indicates a general acceptance cf the principle of elected
officials being responsible to their constituents.

Statement

Response

Improving conditions of

Group
DRP

NDP

life in one's own community

Agree

158 (.96)

74 (.82)

is the best way to serve

Disagree______________ 6 (.04)

16 (.18)

the nation.

Total

90 (1.0)

164 (1.0)

2
X

=

12.91

(p = .001)

0' = .24

A large majority of both the DRP and NDP elites agree that "im
proving conditions of life in one's own community is the best w a y to
serve the nation."

A difference exists, however, in that over ninety

per cent of the DRP elites agree compared to eighty per cent of the
NDP elites.

The DRP as a dominant party that was purposefully struc

tured on a local basis by the party organizers has much stronger local
ties than the NDP.

Due to these stronger local ties and the local

party organization,

the DRP elites tend to be more supportive of serv

ing the local community.

The NDP has suffered in the past from wea k

local organization, and in some cases the local party structures func-
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2

tion only during election periods.

The NDP is more likely to con

tain members that have little regard for local conditions or politics
but are directed to national government concerns.
In general there exist no definite patterns discerning the two
groups on the issue of local or national orientation.

While approxi

mately sixty per cent of the NDP elites agree with both statements,
seventy per cent of the DRP elites agree that national objectives are
to be followed when doubt exists compared to only slightly over fifty
per cent that agree that local needs take precedence when a conflict
exists.

A large proportion of both groups agree that local leaders

should be accountable to the people and that improving one's own
community serves the nation.

With respect to this last position,

statistically significant differences exist between the DRP and NDP
elites, but it is one of intensity or extent of agreement since over
eighty per cent of the NDP elites had indicated approval of this
position.

Leadership

Statement

Response

Group
DRP

A good leader should

NDP

refrain from making

Agree

123

(.75)

68 (.73)

proposals that divide

Disagree_________ 42

(.25)

25 (.27)

the people.

Total

(1.0)

93 (1.0)

165

2
X

= 0.01

0' = .02

2
See Y. C. Han, "Political Parties and Political Development in
South Korea," Pacific A f f a i r s , 42(4), 1969, p. 457.
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Both groups of elites believe that "a good leader should refrain
from making proposals that divide the people."

Three-fourths of the

respondents regardless of party affiliation agree that proposals that
create conflict among the people should not be made by a leader.

This

statement reflects general agreement between the elites that not only
should potentially divisive proposals be avoided but that an indication
of good leadership is the actual avoidance of these types of proposals.
In response to a previous statement roughly eighty-five per cent of
both groups agreed that local leaders should follow the demands and
expectations of the public.

The response to the above statement is

consistent with this in that leaders are to be accountable to the
populace and not be independent by making potentially divisive pro
posals.

Statement

Response

It is important for a

Group
DRP

NDP

leader to do as much

Agree

140 (.85)

54

(.59)

as possible even if he

Disagree__________ 24 (.15)

37

(.41)

displeases people.

Total

91

(1.0)

164 (1.0)

2
X

= 20.37

(p = .001) 0' =

.29

Even though a majority of both groups of elites agree that "it
is important for a leader to do as much as possible even if he dis
pleases people," a significantly higher proportion of the DRP elites
agree compared to the NDP elites.

Interestingly, whi l e three-fourths

of the DRP elites agreed that a leader should not divide the people
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through unpopular proposals, over eighty per cent of these elites
agree that a leader must act even if he displeases people.

Possibly

the interpretation of this statement by the DRP elites emphasizes
that a leader is required to act and should attempt to accomplish as
much as possible, while it would be expected that various individuals
and sectors of the society would be opposed to his actions.

This

position is differentiated from one in which a leader makes a proposal
that is unacceptable to a significant portion of the people.

Statement

Response

It is important for a

Group
DRP

NDP

leader to act according

Agree

83 (.51)

67 (.74)

to his beliefs even if

Disagree

81 (.49)

24 (.26)

he displeases people.

Total

164 (1.0)

91 (1.0)

2
X

= 11.87

(p = .001) 0 ’= .22

While a much larger proportion of the NDP elites agree that "it
is important for a leader to act according to his beliefs even if he
displeases people" than agreed to the previous statement,
elites display a marked decrease

the DRP

in the level of agreement.

More than

eighty per cent of the DRP elites agree that a leader must do as much
as possible.

However, only fifty per cent of the DRP respondents

agree that a leader must act on the basis of his beliefs.

This state

ment reflects a dilemma common to elected officials as to whether the
official should base his actions on the opinion of the majority of his
constituency or use his own political judgement and belief as the
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basis for action.

It is apparent that the DRP elites have indicated

agreement that leaders should be responsive to the people which must
include action based on more than a leader's perceptions and beliefs.
The NDP elites, on the other hand, show a more idealistic view of
leadership in that these elites agree that a leader should be respon
sive to the public, act as much as possible and base his actions on
his own beliefs and attitudes.

Statement

Response

A leader must endeavor

Group
DRP

NDP

to achieve policies if

Agree

92 (.56)

he is convinced of

Disagree

72 (.44)____ 35 (.37)

their merits by public

Total

pressure.

2

164 (1.0)

= 0.84

59 (.63)

94 (1.0)

0' = .06

Majorities of both groups agree that "a leader must endeavor to
achieve policies if he is convinced of their merits by public pres
sure."

While a small majority of DRP elites accept the statement,

over sixty per cent of the NDP elites agree.

As there are no dif

ferences bo t h groups are only slightly agreeable to a leader using
pressure on the public.

Statement

Response

Group
DRP

A leader does not need

NDP

to persuade the public

Agree

87 (.53)

47

if he is certain his act

Disagree

77 (.47)

49 (.51)

will benefit them.

Total

164 (1.0)

96 (1.0)

.2

X“

=

0.26

(.49)

0' = .04
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There is relatively no difference between the elites with respect
to the statement "a leader does not need to persuade the public if he
is certain his act will benefit them"

Each group reflects a relative

ly closely divided position on whether or not persuasion of the public
by a leader is a desired act.
ments on leadership,

In conjunction wi t h the previous state

the DRP tends to be unwilling to accept manipu

lation of the public either through the use of pressure or avoidance
of persuasive techniques.

The DRP elites are only slightly in favor

of a leader acting on his personal beliefs, acting without public
hearing, and using public pressure to achieve policies.

In each of

the responses to these statements there exists a relatively even split
between DRP elites that agree and that disagree indicative of intra
party differences.

Previous statements evoked DRP disapproval with

respect to restricting voting and decision-making, and approval w i t h
respect to the statement involving the avoidance of divisive proposals
by a leader.

These responses indicate that the DRP elites are not

willing to alienate the electorate and display,

to some extent,

greater qualities of political expertise and professionalism.
The NDP elites display similar responses on the statements deal
ing with the proposal of divisive policies, and the use of public
pressure and persuasion.
leader acting on personal

The NDP elites are more supportive of a
belief regardless of public reaction, while

the elites of the DRP emphasize a leader acting as much as possible.
Even though supportive of accountability by a leader,

the NDP elites

again display tendencies toward accepting a stronger leadership role

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

by placing importance on a lea d e r ’s personal beliefs in determining
actions.

Social Justice and Equality

Statement

Response

The poor and the rich

Group
DRP

NDP

should be given equal

Agree

153 (.94)

82

(.89)

opportunity for better-

Disagree_____________ 9 (.06)

10

(.11)

ing their lives.

Total

92

(1.0)

X2

162 (1.0)

= 1.69

0' =

.10

A significant majority of both groups of elites agree that "the
poor and the rich should be given equal opportunity for bettering their
lives".

This statement reflects a general principle of representative

democracy in that all citizens are theoretically given equal social
justice and opportunity.

As these party elites are politically aware

and active within a functioning political system that is based on
democratic principles, it would be expected to obtain large majorities
of both parties in support.

Statement

Response

If an'area of society is

Group
DRP

NDP

behind, it is the responsi-

Agree

133 (.80)

75 (.80)

bility of those who made the

Disagree___________ 33 (.20)

19 (.20)

mistake, however,

Total

94 (1.0)

the govern-

166 (1.0)

2
ment must take actions to

X

= 0.00

0'=

remedy the situation.
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Eighty per cent of all elites regardless of party affiliation
agree that "if an area of society is behind, it is the responsibility
of those who made the mistake.

However,

actions to remedy the situation."

the government must take

The statement reflects the need

for balanced development of the society in all sectors in order to
create a modernized, developed system.

It has been claimed that un3

balanced development leads to instability and violence.

As these

elites are politically aware and exist wi t h i n a developing system it
would be expected that a majority of them would tend to b e aware of
the need for balanced development of the society as well as for govern
mental responsibility for remedial action.

Statement

Response

Parents are expected

Group
DRP

NDP

to assist children

Agree

41 (.25)

63 (.66)

in their social

Disagree__________ 124 (.75)

33 (.34)

advancement.

Total

96 (1.0)

165 (1.0)

2
X

= 40.42

(p = .001)

0' = .40

A wide disparity is indicated between the two groups of elites
by their responses to "parents are expected to assist children in
their social advancement."

While two-thirds of the NDP elites agree

w i t h the statement, only one-fourth of the DRP elites agree.

Possibly

the DRP elites belonging to a dominant party in a modernizing society
attempt to consciously display modern values and attitudes.

One manner

in whi c h to display modernity is to reject traditional values such as

3Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies
Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968) pp. 4-5.

(New
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parental assistance in social advancement.

However,

these differences

may be due to some socio-economic background variable or other factor
that is not readily apparent
In conclusion,

from this data.

the DRP elites display a more

tic, more experienced, and a
that held by the NDP elites.

more electorate
The DRP

politically pragma
oriented position than

elites are aware that problems

exist in the current situation, and acknowledge that low levels of
participation and trust exist.

However, these elites are not willing

to exact restrictive measures due to either political expedience or
a stronger committment to democratic values.

The DRP elites view

good leaders as people who act as much as possible but not without
constituent support even though some of the people will be displeased.
Leaders are also to be accountable to the public, and avoid using
public pressure or personal beliefs to adopt policies.
While the NDP elites are not as supportive of the active leader
ship role, their position is supportive of leadership based on per
sonal beliefs and of a. more authoritarian nature.
the DRP elites,

In comparison to

the NDP elites indicate positions that are not as

politically professional and tend toward a less democratic orienta
tion.

There are no major ideological differences between the two

groups of elites, and those that do exist are primarily caused by
personality differences and the fact of being opposition groups in a
society.

The differences between the attitudes of the two groups of

elites are influenced by the seemingly permanent opposition role of
the NDP as well as the NDP's basic distrust of the DRP politicians.
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The responses of these elites indicates that there are basic
attitudinal differences between party elites of the two major Korean
political parties.

Since this is the case individuals belonging to

the opposition NDP do so in order to satisfy the need for a structure
consistent wi t h their attitudes.

The basic difference existing bet

ween the NDP and DRP reflects a difference in party political orienta
tion indicating that the NDP exists to oppose DRP policies.

The fol

lowing chapters are attempts at explaining the causes of their dif
ferences on the basis of our survey data.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 4

THE SOURCES OF ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES:
MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY ORIENTATIONS

It has been previously indicated that the origin of the two major
parties in Korea differed significantly.

The DRP was formed through

the initiative of Kim Jong-pil and his CIA group which recruited a
number of retired and active military officers as well as profession
als for party positions.

The NDP, on the other hand, was formed

through a merger of opposition parties that included many party w ork
ers and officials experienced not only in politics but in opposition
movements extending from the Rhee era (1948-60).

The previous

analysis has shown differences do exist in certain attitudes between
the elites found in the DRP and the elites belonging to the NDP.

In

order to determine further information concerning the nature of these
differences, it would be useful to determine whether those party
elites belonging to the DRP that indicate a military orientation
differ in attitudes from those party elites in the NDP with similar
orientations prior to becoming party officials.
For this reason the responses of the DRP military oriented will
be compared to the responses of the NDP military oriented party elites
to determine whether differences exist and the actual nature of any
differences that are found.

If the differences found in the earlier

analysis continue to exist in this subsample, it would be an indica
tion that individuals with military career orientations join a party

65
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in Korea also as a means of expressing political choices similar to
the ones expressed by the elites of the two parties in general.

Political Participation and Public Trust

Statement

Group

Response
DRP

The extent of politi
cal awareness of the

Agree

27 (.64)

public is low.

Disagree

15 (.36)

Total

42 (1.0)

X2

= 7.02

NDP
34

(.92)

3 (.08)
37

(1.0)

0!' = .33

(p = .01)

DRP

The degree of political

NDP

participation of the

Agree

27 (.66)

30 (.86)

public is low.

Disagree

14 (.34)

5 (.14)

Total

41 (1.0)

35 (1.0)

2
X

= 2.98

0'=

.23

Within the military oriented respondents there is a general con
sensus that low levels of political participation and awareness exist
in the Korean political system.

The NDP military oriented elites in

dicate greater acceptance of the statements as nearly nine out of ten
agree.
ments,

While the DRP elites are somewhat less supportive of the state
approximately two-thirds of the respondents agree.

The patterns

exhibited above are similar to the responses of the entire sample to
the same statements.
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Statement

Group

Response
DRP

The public respect of

NDP

political leaders is

Agree

22 (.55)

low.

Disagree

18

(.45)

7 (.20)

Total

40

(1.0)

35 (1.0)

28 (.80)

2
X-

= 4.18

(p =

.05)

0' = .26

Only slightly more than one half of the military oriented DRP
elites agree that "the public respect of political leaders is low"
while eight out of ten of the NDP elites agree.

The opposition NDP

indicates its belief that the public does not respect the DRP leader
ship.

The opposition status of the NDP explains a great deal of the

variation in responses between these two groups as seen in the pre
vious statements.

However, while a majority of the DRP elites con

cede that participation and awareness levels are low, there is greater
disparity whe n the leadership of the DRP is questioned.

The DRP

military oriented elites tend to be slightly less supportive of this
statement than the entire sample of DRP elites.

Statement

Response

Group
DRP

As people trust govern

NDP

ment their concern about

Agree

public issues increases.

Disagree_________ 4__(.10)_____ 8 (.22)
Total
X

= 1.39

38

(.90)

42 (1.0)

29

37

(.78)

(1.0)

0 ’ = .17
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While only a slight majority of DRP military oriented elites
agreed that the public respect of leaders is low, ninety per cent of
the DRP respondents agreed that "as people trust government their
concern about public issues increases."

The NDP military oriented

elites display roughly the same proportion of agreement as in the
previous statement.

The above response implies that while a majority

of DRP elites agree that participation, awareness, and respect for
leaders is low, a much higher proportion agree that increasing trust
in government would increase public concern which may possibly alle
viate many of these participation problems.

This belief is shared by

the NDP elites, and while there is no statistical difference the pro
portions are similar to those of the entire sample.

Evidently party

elites view trust in government as a means to obtain increased levels
of public participation in the form of issue interest.

Statement

Response

Group

Most decisions should

DRP

NDP

be left to the judge

Agree

ment of experts.

Disagree

34 (.81)

12

Total

42

33 (1.0)

8 (.19)

(1.0)

2
X

= 13.67

(P = .001)

Only those who are fully

21 (.70)

r=

(.30)

.45

DRP

NDP

informed on the issues

Agree

12

(.29)

21 (.60)

should vote.

Disagree

29 (.71)

14 (.40)

Total

41

35 (1.0)

(1.0)

2
X

=6.06

(p- = .01)

r=

.31
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Seven out of ten NDP military oriented elites agree that "most
decisions should be left to the judgement of experts," while less
than two out of ten of the DRP elites agree.

In response to the

statement "only those who are fully informed on the issues should
vote", a similar disparity exists between the two groups as sixty per
cent of the NDP elites agree compared to less than thirty per cent of
the DRP military oriented elites.

These two statements clearly indi

cate a less democratic position on the part of the NDP elites.

These

elites are quite willing to restrict decision-making powers to experts
and desire voting by the informed only.

The DRP elites indicate a

more practical approach to politics by its rather widespread rejection
of these two statements.

While consistency exists between DRP elites

in general and DRP military oriented elites,

the NDP military oriented

elites tend to be more supportive of both of these statements than the
other non-military oriented elites of the NDP.
It is also possible that politics influenced this response as
the DRP being the party in power obviously employs expert decision
makers within the administrative democracy established by President
Park.

Furthermore, the DRP elites would reject restricted voting not

only on an ideological level but as practical politics as the DRP re
ceives large support from rural areas whi l e the opposition NDP re
ceives its basic support from urban areas.
With respect to previous statements the DRP military oriented
elites acknowledge that political problems exist in Korea.
the NDP elites, however,

Unlike

the DRP is unwilling to support extreme
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positions in order to affect these problems.

The NDP elites indicate

a less professional political outlook tending to be more extreme and
less democratic in the positions taken.

Conflict Resolution

Statement

Response

It is desirable in

Group
DRP

NDP

reaching political

Agree

40 (.95)

23 (.66)

decisions to recon-

Disagree__________ 2 (.05)

12 (.34)

cile conflicting

Total

35 (1.0)

interests.

X2

= 9.29

42 (1.0)
(p = .01)

01 =

.38

In response to the statement "it is desirable in reaching politi
cal decisions to reconcile conflicting interests," a significantly
larger proportion of the DRP elites agree than NDP elites.

While over

ninety per cent of the DRP military oriented elites agree, only twothirds of the NDP respondents are in agreement with the statement.
This statement is a further indication of the less democratic position
of the NDP as one-third of the NDP military oriented elites do not
value conflict resolution in the decision-making process.

The majority

of DRP elites agreeing with the statement indicates the acceptance of
politics as conflict resolution by the DRP military oriented elites.
These responses are consistent with those of the entire sample.
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National or Local Orientation

Response

Statement
In case of conflict,

Group
DRP

the

NDP

needs of the local com

Agree

21 (.50)

18

munity take precedence

Disagree

21 (.50)

16 (.47)

over national concern.

Total

42 (1.0)

34 (1.0)

X

=0.00

(.53)

0' = .03

The statement "in case of conflict the needs of the local com
munity take precedence over national concern" shows considerable dis
agreement not between the two groups of military oriented elites, but
within each party.

The military oriented NDP elites are less suppor

tive of this position than the entire NDP sample.

Response

Statement

Group
DRP

When in doubt, local

NDP

leaders should decide

Agree

27

(.64)

19

in favor of national

Disagree

15

(.36)

17 (.47)

government objectives.

Total

42

(1.0)

36

(.53)

(1.0)

2
X

= 0.64

0'=

.12

In response to the statement "when in doubt local leaders should
decide in favor of national government objectives," nearly two-thirds
of the DRP elites agree.

The previous statement indicated that the

elites were evenly split between local or national precedence wh e n a
situation of conflict exists.

While the NDP elites continue to hold
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this position when a situation of doubt exists, a larger proportion
of the DRP military oriented elites favor national government objectives
over local w h e n doubt as to the proper course exists.

Statement

Response

Group

Local leaders should

DRP

follow the demands and

Agree

expectations of the

Disagree

local public and not

Total
2

independently.

=

NDP

35 (.83)

29

7 (.17)
42

6 (.17)

(1.0)

0.00

(.83)

35

(1.0)

d' = .01

Slightly greater than eight out of ten elites regardless of party
affiliation agree with the statement "local leaders should follow the
demands and expectations of the local public and not act independently.1
The high rate of agreement by both groups of military oriented elites
is not unusual considering the nature of the statement.

This state

ment actually involves accountability of elected representatives to
the general public, a position that is generally assumed to be true in
most representative democracies.

This is a further indication that

both grpups of elites view leadership as a situation w h e r e the will of
the people is to b e considered.

Statement

Response

Improving conditions of

Group
DRP

life in one's own com

Agree

munity is the best way

Disagree

to serve the nation.

Total

NDP

39 (.93)

26 (.74)

3 (.07)

9 (.26)

42 (1.0)

35

(1.0)

2
= 3.69

d' =

.25
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In response to the statement "improving conditions of life in one's
own community is the best w a y to serve the nation," mor e than ninety
per cent of the military oriented DRP elites agree, wh i l e only threefourths of the NDP elites agree.

The DRP organization extends to local

communities which may affect the local considerations of DRP members.
The NDP, on the other hand, has relatively w e a k local organization.
There is relatively no difference between the elites of either
party having military backgrounds wit h respect to local or national
orientation.

Regardless of party the elites tend to agree that leaders

should be accountable to the public.

There is disagreement within

each party as to the proper course of action with respect to decisions
in cases where conflict or doubt exists between the national and local
priorities.

While a greater proportion of DRP elites favor improving

local conditions to serve the nation, the NDP elites agree in principle
as nearly three-fourths of the respondents approve.
There are no significant deviations in these responses from the
entire party samples.

These responses also indicate that those elites

with a military oriented background do not present a unified political
orientation within or between parties.
Leadership
Statement

Response

Group
DRP

A good leader should re-

NDP

frain from making proposals

Agree

28 (.67)

22

(.63)

that divide the people.

Disagree

14 (.33)

13

(.37)

Total

42 (1.0)

35

(1.0)

2
X

= 0.01

= .04
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Two-thirds of all military oriented elites regardless of party
agreed that "a good leader should refrain from making proposals that
divide the people."

Both groups of military oriented elites are less

supportive on this statement than the entire sample.

Statement

Response

Group

It is important for a

DRP

leader to do as much

Agree

as possible even if he

Disagree

displeases people.

Total
X2

NDP

36 (.86)

23 (.66)

6 (.14)______ 12 (.34)
42 (1.0)

= 3.22

35 (1.0)
0'=

.24

At least two-thirds of all elites agreed that "it is important
for leader to do as much as possible even if he displeases people."
Although the difference is not statistically significant, a greater
proportion of military oriented elites belonging to the DRP agreed
than those from theopposition NDP.

The DRP elites tend to be more

aware that even though it is not possible for a leader to please all
segments of the populace the leader still must act.

Statement

Response

It is important for a

Group
DRP
21 (.50)

NDP

leader to act according

Agree

to his beliefs even if

Disagree__________ 21 (.50)______ 12 (.33)

he displeases people.

Total

42 (.10)

24 (.67)

36 (1.0)

2
X

= 1.58

0' = .17
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The military oriented elites of the DRP are evenly split between
agreement and disagreement with the statement "it is important for a
leader to act according to his beliefs even if he displeases people."
Approximately two-thirds of the NDP elites agree wit h this statement.
It was seen by the responses to the previous statement, that greater
than eighty per cent of these DRP elites agreed that a leader must act
even if he displeases people.

Since only fifty per cent agree that a

leader should act according to his beliefs even if he displeases peo
ple, it is evident that the DRP elites distinguish between acting
as much as possible and acting based on personal beliefs.

This was

also indicated by a previous statement involving a leader following
the demands and expectations of the public.

Therefore, the DRP elites

tend to be more conscious of the public.

Statement

Response

Group

A leader must endeavor

DRP
19

to achieve policies if

Agree

he is convinced of

Disagree________ 23

(.55)_____ 17 (.47)

their merits by public

Total

(1.0)

42

(.45)

NDP
15 (.53)

36 (1.0)

2
pressure.

X

= 0.19

0' = .08

In response to the statement "a leader must endeavor to achieve
policies if he is convinced of their merits by public pressure," a
slight majority of the military oriented elites from the DRP disagreed
while a majority from the NDP agreed.

Again it is evident that the

DRP elites reject the use of public pressuring to achieve policies,
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a position that is consistent wit h their indication of being cognizant
of the will of the people.

The NDP elites also indicate less willing

ness to accept an authoritarian leadership role as implied b y the
statement than was shown in earlier statements.

Less proportions of

each military oriented group agreed with this statement than the en
tire sample.

Statement

Response

Group

A leader does not need
to persuade the public

DRP
Agree

NDP

18 (.43)

23

(.62)
(.38)

if he is certain his

Disagree_________ 24 (.57)

14

act will benefit them.

Total

37 (1.0)

42

(1.0)

2
X

= 2.21

0' = .19

A majority of the military oriented DRP elites reject the state
ment "a leader does not need to persuade the public if he is certain
his act will benefit them."

The NDP elites agree with over sixty

per cent of the respondents believing a leader does not need to per
suade the public.

As in previous statements involving leadership the

DRP elites seem to consider the attitude of the public while the NDP
elites support a stronger type of leadership role.

The NDP military

elites exhibit a much higher rate of agreement w ith the statement
than all NDP respondents.

However, while the NDP military oriented

are more willing to bypass public persuasion than all NDP elites,
they are less willing to use public pressure.
With respect to leadership the military oriented elites of the
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DRP strongly agree that a leader must "do as much as possible even if
he displeases people," and at least half of the respondents content
that a leader should not act "according to his beliefs" and should not
"achieve policies if he is convinced of their merits by public pressure,
but should "persuade the public if he is certain his act will benefit
them".

It has been shown in the previous chapter that the DRP elites

s e e m to be more professional in a political sense than the NDP elites.
Their responses to statements dealing w i t h leadership further supports
the position that the DRP elites are m ore aware of the need for inter
action between the public and the leader.

While no statistically

significant differences exist, the NDP elites seem to be more wi l l i n g
to accept a less democratic leader who acts as much as possible but
acts according to his beliefs, and achieves policies through public
pressure but not public persuasion.

Social Justice and Equality

Statement

Response

The poor and the rich

Group
DRP

NDP

should be given equal

Agree

38 (.90)

30 (.88)

opportunity for better-

Disagree__________ 4 (.10)_______ 4 (.12)

ing their lives.

Total

42 (1.0)

34 (1.0)

2
X

= 0.00

0'

= .04

A large majority of both groups of military oriented party elites
agree that "the poor and the rich should b e given equal opportunity
for bettering their lives."

As this statement is indicative of the
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general principle of equal social and economic opportunity it is not
unusal to find high rates of agreement regardless of party affiliation
or background orientation.

Statement

Response

Group

If a n area of society is

NDP

DRP

behind, it is the respon

Agree

sibility of those who

Disagree

made the mistake.

Total

However,

2

the government must take

35 (.83)

31

6 (.16)

7 (.17)
42 (1.0)

(.84)

37

(1.0)

i' = .01

= 0.06

actions to remedy the situa
tion.

More than eighty per cent of all military oriented party elites
agree that "if an area of society is behind,
of those who made the mistake.

However,

actions to remedy the situation."

it is the responsibility

the government must take

This statement reflects the general

ly accepted procedure of balanced social, political, and economic de
velopment desired in creating a stable, effective system.

For this

reason high levels of agreement are not unexpected.

Statement

Response

Parents are expected to

Group
DRP

NDP

assist children in

Agree

11 (.26)

28 (.76)

their social advancement.

Disagree

31 (.74)

9 (.24)

Total

42 (1.0)

37

(p = .001)

0' =

(1.0)

2
X

= 17.34
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The statement "parents are expected to assist children in their
social advancement" displays a rather strong difference between the
DRP and NDP military oriented elites.

Over three-fourths of the NDP

elites agree compared to only one-fourth of the DRP.

This response

is similar to that of the entire sample although the NDP military
oriented elites agree somewhat more extensively.
Basically,

the military oriented elites differ only slightly from

the entire sample of elites.

The NDP military oriented seem more

authoritarian than the DRP military oriented elites and the NDP sample
as a whole.
The DRP military oriented elites display similar responses on all
statements with respect to the responses of the entire sample of DRP
elites.

The DRP, although it has suffered from fragmentation in the

past, has not encountered any major problem of factionalism within
its ranks.

The comparison of these responses indicates that there are

no differences between military and non-military party elites within
the DRP.

The military oriented DRP elites acknowledge low levels of

participation in politics but are not w i l l i n g to support restrictive
measures.

They see politics as a means of resolving conflicts and

view leadership as a relationship between the populace and leader in
order for a leader to do as much as possible without necessarily
needing to use public pressure or persuasion.

The military oriented

DRP elites tend toward a strongly supportive position on general
statements reflecting a democratic society.
The NDP elites of a military orientation also are very similar
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in attitude toward the entire sample of NDP elites.

One difference,

however, is that the military oriented tend to be more willing to
approve decision-making restrictions and to desire voting by the in
formed only.

These military oriented elites of the NDP are also more

willing to approve of a leader who does not persuade the public to
accept an act when convinced of the benefits.
however, a similarity of views is apparent.

On other statements,
The NDP military oriented

elites, much like all NDP elites, are more convinced of the low levels
of participation and trust than their DRP counterparts.

The NDP

military oriented seem less democratically natured and more willing
to accept political restraints.

They do not emphasize conflict re

solution as extensively as the DRP military oriented elites.

The NDP

also tends to be slightly more locally oriented but do not accept im
proving local conditions as the best way to serve the nation.

Lead

ership statements again reflect the less democratic aspects of the
attitudes of the NDP elites.

More NDP military oriented agreed that

a leader should act according to his beliefs, use public pressure,
and avoid public persuasion than DRP military oriented elites.
In summation,

the patterns discerned between the entire samples

of the DRP and NDP elites remained consistent between the military
oriented of each party.

Although military oriented party elites

feel that their military experience has assisted their present posi
tion within the party, they indicate no widely divergent attitudes
with respect to non-military oriented elites.

The differences in

attitudes between the DRP and the NDP exist not only between the
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respective general party elites but also are consistent between a
subdivision of the elites into military and non-military oriented
elites.

The following comparison of the phi-prime scores indicates

that in general there is no consistent pattern of differences between
the military oriented and the entire sample.

On certain particular

items such as the statements dealing with participation and conflict
resolution,

the military group displays higher phi-prime scores indi

cating that in these areas the military elites are less alike than the
entire group of elites.

The largest differences are found to be on

the statements involving the restriction of decision making,

the

desire for informed voting, viewing decision making as a conflict
reconciliation process,

and the persuasion of the public by a leader.

To further probe on the sources of these attitudinal differences bet
ween DRP and NDP elites,

the next chapter analyzes other background

variables such as age, place of birth, education and non-military
career experiences.

0' For Three Comparisons Between DRP and NDP Elites

Statement

All Elites

Military

Non-Military

The extent of political
awareness of the public
is low.

.30

.33

.25

The degree of political
participation of the
public is low.

.27

.23

.30

The public

.18

.26

.18

respect of

political leaders is low.
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Non-Military

All Elites

Military

As people trust government their concern about
public issues also in
creases.

.21

.17

.20

Most decisions should be
left to the judgement of
experts.

.13

.45

.01

Only those who are fully
informed on the issues
should vote.

.22

.31

.12

It is desirable in reaching political decisions
to reconcile conflicting
interests.

.22

.38

.12

In case of conflict the
needs of the local com
munity take precedence
over national concern.

.09

.03

.07

When in doubt, local
leaders should decide in
favor of national
government objectives.

.11

.12

.04

Local leaders should
follow the demands and
expectations of the local
public and not act inde
pendently.

.06

.01

.04

Improving conditions of
life in one's own com
munity is the best way
to serve the nation.

.24

.25

.14

A good leader should
refrain from making
proposals that divide
the people.

.02

.04

.04

It is important for a
leader to do as much as
possible even if he
displeases people.

.29

.24

.26

Statement
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Statement
It is important for a
leader to act according
to his beliefs even if
he displeases people.

All Elites

Military

Non-Military

.22

.17

.31

A leader must endeavor
to achieve policies if
he is convinced of their
merits by public pressure.

.06

.08

.14

A leader does not need
to persuade the public
if he is certain his
act will benefit them.

.04

.19

.11

The poor and the rich
should be given equal
opportunity for better
ing their lives.

.10

.04

.14

If an area of society
is behind, it is the
responsibility of those
who made the mistake.
H o w e v e r , the government
must take actions to
remedy the situation.

.00

.01

.01

Parents are expected to
assist children in their
social advancement.

.40

.47

.47
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CHAPTER 5

THE SOURCES OF ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES:
OTHER BACKGROUND VARIABLES

The usefulness of background variables in the analysis of politi-

1
cal attitudes has been questioned.

The primary problem was esta

blishing a linkage between these variables and particular political
attitudes while providing a justification of h ow and w hy background
variables affect attitudes and, consequently, behavior.

Bendix has

stated that "the social composition of the members and leaders of
different political organizations

. . . will provide a clue to the

2
political goals which their leaders are likely to pursue."

Edinger

and Searing contend that political attitudes are often assumed to be
a function "of socio-economic and psychological characteristics which

For this discussion see Donald Searing, "The Comparative Study
of Elite Socialization," Comparative Political S t u d i e s , 1(4), Jan.
1969, Lewis Edinger and Donald Searing, "Social Background in Elite
Analysis-A Methodological Inquiry," American Political Science R e v i e w ,
61, June 1967, pp. 428-445. Dankwart Rustow, "The Study of Elites:
W h o ’s Who, When, and How," World P o l i t i c s , 18(4), July 1966, D o nald
Mathews, The Social Backgrounds of Political D e cision Makers (New
York:
Random, 1962), Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite
(Cambridge:
M.I.T. Press, 1965), W i l i a m B. Quandt, Comparative Study
of Political Elites (Rand Corporation No. P-4172, Sept. 1969), Harold
Lasswell and Daniel L e m e r , World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge:
M.I.T. Press, 1966), U. Schleth, "Once Again Does It Pay To Study
Social Background in Elite Analysis?", Social-Wissenschaftliches Jahrbuch Fur Politik, 2, 1971, pp. 99-118.

2
Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power,"
in Bendix and Seymour Lipset, eds., C l a s s , Status and Power (Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1953), p. 596.

84
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3
in aggregate can be related to relevant background data."

In

attempting to connect background and attitudes, Edinger and Searing
further state that social background variable analysis "represents
an attempt to classify the contexts of the aggregate socialization
experience in which elite attitudes are formed in order to explain the
collective orientations of members of influential social circles, or
to forecast probability distributions of these orientations among
them.

,.4
However,

Frey has stated that the connection "from some knowledge

of the social backgrounds of national politicians to inferences about
the power structure of the society is quite dangerous.

Even to pro

ceed from such knowledge to judgements about the political behavior
of these same politicians can be treacherous —

"^.

Edinger and

Searing add that "applications of the social background approach have
left unanswered the question of how and to what extent data of this

6.
nature actually can be used to forecast attitudinal distributions."
In addition to these difficulties problems of poor methodology,

in-

7
complete data, and inadequate theories exist.
In order to improve the usefulness of social background studies,

3
Edinger and Searing, p. 431,
^ibid.
^Frey, p. 157.

6
Edinger and Searing, p. 431.
^Quandt, p. 5.
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a number of suggestions have been proposed.

Edinger and Searing

contend that some background variables are consistently better pre
dictors of attitudes within any given system,

that certain attitudes

are more frequently related to various background variables than
others according to the particular system, and that the importance of
the relation between attitudes and background will vary again accord-

8
ing to the system.
For the case of the individual nation studies involving one level
of authority at one given time have been claimed to be least valuable
while studies at more than one level of authority over several time

9
periods are more effective.

Quandt also has claimed that to avoid

present difficulties there is a need for standard categories of data
and standard data collection procedures.

If quantified correctly it

is evident that certain background variables such as age, occupation
and education can be used as a measure of socialization experiences.
This is a position also supported by Rustow who has claimed that "it
is possible to shift the emphasis from the social or class origins of
politicians to their education,

training and other formative ex-

,,10

periences.

It is generally accepted that certain background variables and

Edinger and Searing, p. 431.
9
op. cit., p. 6.
"^Rustow, p. 704.

See also Frey, p. 157.
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experiences are invaluable in explaining individual attitudes and

11
behavior in an in-depth personality study.

In aggregate form these

variables can be used in order to describe any patterns of background
common to a group.

As differences were shown to exist between certain

attitudes of the elites of the two parties, it is possible that these
differences were in part influenced by differences in background.

For

this reason certain background characteristics including age, b irth
place, education and prior occupation of the DRP and NDP elites wi l l
be compared to determine if background differences exist between the
elites of this survey.

The nature of any differences in these measures

of formative experiences may assist in the explanation of the develop
ment of the differing attitudinal orientations found to exist between
Korean party elites.

Robert Lane states that "....the common m an has a set of emo
tionally charged political beliefs, a critique of alternative pro
posals, and some modest programs of reform.
These beliefs embrace
central values and institutions:
they are rationalizations of in
terests (sometimes not his own); and they serve as moral justification
for daily acts and beliefs...there is a difference between the articu
lated, differentiated, well-developed political arguments put forward
by, informed and conscious Marxists, Fascists or liberal democrats on
the one hand, and the loosely structured, unreflective statements of
the common men...it is useful to distinguish between the 'forensic*
ideologies of the conscious ideologist and the 'latent' ideologies of
the common man."
Political Ideology (New York:
The Free Press, 1962)
pp. 15-16.
For examples of in-depth personality studies see James
Barber, The Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1972) and Alexander and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson
and Colonel H o u s e : A Personality Study (New York:
Dover, 1956).
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Year of Birth

Frequency

Before 1915

DRP
Cumulated
Proportion

Frequency

NDP
Cumulated
Proportion

6

.035

4

.040

1915-1924

28

.199

19

.230

1925-1934

73

.626

33

.560

1935-1944

58

.965

31

.870

After 1944

6

1.000

Total

171

D = .095

13

1.0C

(NS)

The above table indicates that there are no basic differences in
age between the elites of the two parties.

Approximately ten per

cent more NDP elites were born after 1944 than DRP elites, while ten
per cent more DRP elites were born du r i n g the 1925 to 1934 period.
However, these differences are onl y of a minor nature and do not
reflect any general trends.

All tables in this chapter were calculated using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic except for urban-rural place of birth.
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Length of Party Works

Frequency

DRP
Cumulated
Proportion

Frequency

NDP
Cumulated
Proportion

Less than 6 months

11

.066

3

.030

6 months - 1 year

12

.138

11

.141

1 year - 2 years

31

.323

18

.323

2 years - 5 years

44

.587

10

.424

More than 5 years

69

1.000

57

1.000

Total

167

D = .163

99

(NS)

While approximately thirty percent of each group has belonged to
their respective party
of

for less than two years, nearly

the NDP elites compared

to forty percent

of the

been party workers for more than five years.

sixty percent

DRP elites have

Apparently b oth parties

have a sizeable group of long term professional party workers.

Urban or Rural Birthplace
DRP
Urban

80

Small city

(49%)

9(6%)

Rural

74
Total

NDP
29 (29%)
9 (9%)

(45%)_________ 61 (62%)

163 (100%)

99 (100%)

2
= 10.08 (p = .01)

df = 2
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With respect to urban or rural place of birth sixty per cent of
the NDP elites were b o m

in rural areas while slightly over forty per

cent of the DRP elites were rural b o m .

When small cities are in

cluded a majority of the DRP elites were born in urban areas while
the NDP elites of this sample are primarily from non-urban areas.
This may assist in explaining the rather unusual difference found in
response to the statement dealing with parental assistance in a
child's advancement.
bom

Perhaps the majority of NDP elites being rural

tend to hold more traditional outlooks on certain social con

cerns.

Thus, a majority of the NDP elites agreed with the Confucian

principle of parental assistance.

Educational Background

Frequency

DRP
Cumulated
Proportion

Frequency

NDP
Cumulati
Proport:

Self Study

2

.012

2

.002

6 years

4

.035

8

.010

9 years

23

.170

27

.370

12 years

42

.415

35

.720

College Graduate

81

.889

26

.980

Graduate Work

19

1.000

2

1.000

Total
D = .305

171

100

(p = .001)

The educational background of the elites indicates a pronounced
difference between the two groups of elites.

Fifty-eight per cent
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of the DRP elites are college graduates while only twenty-eight per
cent of the NDP elites have received a college degree.

Of those

elites graduating from college nineteen per cent of those in the DRP
have completed some graduate w o r k compared to only two percent of those
belonging to the NDP.

The higher educational attainment of the DRP

elites may have been responsible for the more democratic and pragmatic
tendencies evidenced in responses to the attitudinal statements.

Pre

sumably the DRP as the party in power would offer considerable benefits
over the NDP to recent college graduates being recruited for party
positions.

Prior Occupation

NDP
Cumulated
Proport:

Frequency

DRP
Cumulated
Proportion

Civil Service

21

.126

16

.165

Business Enterprise

29

.301

14

.309

Commerce & P.etail

40

.542

27

.588

Military Officer

10

.602

.4

.629

Agriculture

13

. .681

19

.825

Teaching

18

.789

3

.856

Clerk

19

.904

7

.928

Others

16

1.000

7

1.000

Total

166

D = .144

(NS)

Frequency

97
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As sixty per cent of the NDP elites were b orn in rural areas, it
would be expected to find a significant portion of the NDP elites to
be engaged in agriculture prior to becoming party officials.

Both

groups display similar proportions of elites from civil service,
business, and commerce and retail positions.

Forty per cent of each

group had been in business related occupations prior to assuming
official party positions.

There is also no evidence for a pre

ponderance of former military officers in the DRP as only six per cent
of the DRP elites had formerly been officers.

It is evident that the

two parties have recruited from a variety of civilian areas and that
certain minor differences reflect the origin and education differences
found to exist between the parties.

13
Father's Education

Frequency

DRP
Cumulated
Proportion

Frequency

NDP
Cumulated
Proportion

Self Study

26

.164

23

.258

6 years

49

.475

28

.573

9 years

46

.766

26

.865

12 years

24

.918

7

.944

College Graduate

13

1.000

5

1.000

Total
D

= .099

168

89

(NS)

13
The importance of a father s impact on a child's political
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In a
extensive

previous table

it was seen that

educational background

their fathers'

the DRP elites

had a more

than the NDP elites. Wit h respect

to

education the two groups of elites show relatively lit

tle differences,

although more NDP elites have fathers that have re

ceived less than six years of education.

In general the fathers of

present party elites display a much lower educational attainment level
than their sons.

Father's Occupation

Frequency

DRP
Cumulated
Proportion

Frequency

NDP
Cumulated
Proport:

Civil Service

15

.089

9

.094

Business Enterprise

27

.250

15

.250

Commerce & Retail

38

.476

25

.510

Agriculture

72

.905

42

.948

Others

16

1.000

5

1.000

D

=

96

168

Total
.043

(NS)

beliefs is threefold according to Lane:
"First, through indoctrina
tion, both overt and covert as a model for imitation, so that the son
picks up the loyalties, beliefs, and values of the old man.
Second,
he places the child in a social context,
giving h i m an ethnicity,
class position, and community or regional environment.
He also
helps to shape political beliefs b y his personal relations w i t h his
son and by the wa y he molds the personality that must sustain and
develop social orientations." A cursory measure of a father's p o 
tential status and social context is occupation and education.
Lane, Political Ideology, pp.

268-269.
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The occupations of fathers of party elites display practically no
differences.

Greater than forty per cent of the fathers w ere engaged

in agriculture and approximately another forty per cent wer e employed
either in business enterprise or commerce and retail positions.

As

was the case wit h education, f a t h e r ’s occupation has no discernable
effect on the attitudinal differences found to exist between the DRP
and NDP elites.
In summation,

these background variables have indicated several

distinctions between the two groups of party elites.

The DRP elites

tended to be slightly older than the NDP elites although no statisti
cally significant relation existed.
were born in urban areas, however,
rural born.

Nearly half of the DRP elites
the remaining forty per cent were

The DRP elites tended to be highly educated wit h over

eighty percent of the sample receiving at least twelve years of
schooling, while nearly sixty per cent wer e college graduates or
graduate students.

The DRP elites primarily were engaged in business

oriented occupations prior to becoming party officials.
The NDP elites, on the other hand, were slightly younger than
the DRP elites although both groups had similar proportions of old
politicians in their party.

More NDP elites also had been involved

in party wo r k longer than five years w h e n compared to the DRP.

The

NDP elites tended to be born in rural areas even though less than
one-third were born in urban areas.

Whi l e the NDP elites were not

uneducated, their level of educational attainment was not as pro
nounced as that found in the DRP.

Sixty per cent had at least
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twelve years of schooling but only twenty-eight per cent had graduated
from college.
tions.

The NDP elites also tended to be from business occupa

However, civil service and agriculture occupations w ere more

common among the NDP elites.
The fact that the DRP elites are typically older than NDP elites
indicates support of the more pgagmatic attitudes displayed by DRP
elites.

It is often the case that younger politically active partici

pants being less experienced are apt to be more idealistic especially
when in opposition.

The DRP has a large proportion of young party

members, however, indicative of the effective recruitment practices
of the party.
It was seen that the DRP elites generally tended to be of a more
modernistic outlook with respect to political attitudes and were more
supportive of general democratic principles.

While urban centers

often are the center of opposition in developing nations,

they are

also the centers of modernizing influences and represent a markedly
different environment from the less modern, less developed, and less
Western influenced rural areas.

A significantly higher proportion

of the DRP elites were born in urban areas indicating that the socia
lizing experiences common to urban centers may have affected their
attitudinal orientation differently than those experiences encountered
by the rural-born majority of NDP elites.
A significantly higher proportion of DRP elites were college
graduates.

This pattern is reflective of the dominant status of the

DR P in the party system.

The DRP offers the most advantageous means
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of obtaining power, status, and influence.

This is especially true

for college graduates who are actively recruited by the DRP organiza
tion, while the NDP has suffered from its advanced inabilities to re
cruit support from young elites.

Education clearly has an extensive

effect on the determination of individual aspirations and the focalization of interests and attitudes.

Thus, the educational experience

of the sixty per cent of DRP elites who were college graduates would
tend to create more awareness of political responsibility and accep
tance of modern political values.
statements,

In the responses to the attitudinal

the DRP elites tended to display a committment to various

values representative of Western style democratic systems.

Under

thirty per cent of the NDP elites had graduated from college and the
primary orientations of the NDP sample were less supportive of demo
cratic values and more willing to accept an authoritarian style of
government.
A number of fc tors other than these background variables will
have had an effect on the adoption of the political attitudes that
typify the DRP and NDP.

It is apparent, however, that the differences

in age, place of birth, and educational attainment existing between
the DRP and NDP elites offer some insight into the causes of atti
tudinal differences.

These background differences have provided the

elites wi t h differing socialization and politicization experiences
that are reflected in different political attitudinal orientations
between the two parties.
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CONCLUSION

The Third Republic of Park has emphasized economic growth and
the formation of a highly centralized, stable national government.

This

emphasis has placed many aspects of political development in an un
favorable position.

Local government autonomy and political education

have been disregarded in favor of the mobilization of national loy
alties due to perceived internal and external threats of communist
aggression.

Park's central leadership role has made the system more

reliant on his personal authority than on institutional arrangements.
While the procedures of compromise and persuasion are available,

the

tendency of the Park regime has been to use physical violence and
manipulation of the constitution and other institutions of the system
to maintain power.

While these aspects of development have been n eg

lected, the Park regime has instead opted for the establishment of
political stability and authority, agricultural and industrial develop
ment, and the improvement of the standard of living for large segments
of the population in both urban and rural areas.
The opposition has had relatively little success in preventing
any of the proposals of Park and the DRP, and although at times the
NDP has seemed to be potentially able to assert some degree of in
fluence, notably following the 1971 National Assembly elections,
ruling DRP has effectively bypassed these occurrences.

the

The NDP's lack

of success is partly due to the inherent advantages given to the ruling
party in the Korean system.

The centralized governmental agencies act

as extensions of the ruling party in not only mobilizing rural voters
96
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but in dispersing appropriations.

Internally, the NDP has h a d low

levels of elite recruitment combined w i t h hig h levels of factionalism
and fragmentation.

Unlike the DRP the NDP has had restricted campaign

funding and poor local contact wit h the populace.

Although it is true

that the NDP has often based campaigns on the issue of the alleged
corruption of the Park administration,

following an internal reform

movement the NDP's 1971 presidential candidate, Kim Tae-jung, p r o 
posed a set of policies that were clearly an alternative to those ad
vanced by President Park.

However,

the resulting unity of the NDP was

ineffective since following the creation of the Fourth Republic,

Park

de-emphasized the role of political parties and popular elections.
While the opposition has had little success in Korean politics,
the analysis of the survey respondents indicated that a number of dif
ferences exist between party elites of the DRP and those of the NDP.
The DRP elites appear to be more democratically inclined, at least
theoretically, with a greater sense of awareness of the electorate.
Their attitudes indicated a policy of pragmatic action designed to
improve conditions but not to alienate voters.

As a party primarily

interested in winning elections rather than changing the ideologies
of the people, the DRP develops pragmatic programs aimed at conso
lidating support."*"

The military oriented elites were found to have

primarily the same attitudes found w i t h i n the entire sample of DRP
elites.

The extensive educational background of these DRP elites

^"Myron Wiener and Joseph LaPalombara, eds., Political Parties
and Political Development (Princeton:
Princeton University Press,
1966) p. 405.
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is useful in explaining their awareness of the existence of several
institutionalization failures of the system as w e l l as the inclination
of the DRP to support attitudes that are common to developed, modern
political systems.

As university graduates are a part of the moderniz

ing elite, it is not unusual that the DRP reflects a more modern
political outlook since more than half of the DRP elites wer e college
graduates.

It was also seen that a majority of DRP elites were born

in urban areas indicating further influences of modernization on these
elites during the process of forming political values and attitudes.
The NDP elites indicated a greater willingness to accept measures
that would restrict the freedoms normally associated with democratic
government.

For example,

the governing elite is more likely to de

sire political participation by less literate voters than the opposi-

2
tion.

In this case a much higher proportion of NDP elites desired

voting by the informed only.

In general,

the NDP did not indicate

considerable concern wit h pleasing the populace.

The NDP elites also

exhibited a more positive attitude toward authoritarian leadership and
tended to be more of an idealistic rather than pragmatic nature.

The

military oriented NDP elites w e r e slightly more authoritarian and ex
treme than the entire NDP sample.

In terms of the background char

acteristics and socialization experiences, the NDP elites tended to
be primarily rural born, younger, and less educated.

The attitudes

of these elites are indicative of a m o r e traditional political outlook

Y. C. Han, "Political Parties and Political Development in South
Korea, "Pacific A f f a i r s , 42(4), 1971.
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perhaps resulting from background experiences less conducive to
modern influences.

Certain attitudes of these elites have also been

affected by a basic distrust of DRP politicians and policies, and the
seemingly permanent opposition status of the party.
The results of the analysis supports the contention that political
opposition in Korea is based on a need to provide an alternative to
the dominant party.

However, it is clear that the opposition has been

dominated by the DRP and has been unable to effectively institution
alize its position.

The repeated failures of the opposition have

created tendencies toward the use of rhetorical statements and drama
tics in the political activity of the party, but the NDP has continued
its efforts to remove Park and the DRP from control of the government.
The analysis shows that certain political attitudinal differences
do in fact exist between the elites of the two major political par
ties in Korea.

It is possible that party elites are more ideologi

cally motivated than regular party members or party followers, and
that these differences in attitudes are present only at the elite le3
vel.

As attitudes form an integral part of latent political ideology,

the basic guiding principles that motivate activity differ from ruling
to opposition party.

While it may be true that these guiding prin

ciples are formalized due to the actual party wor k of any given elite,

3
See Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York:
Free Press,
1962) pp. 13-16.
Lane contrasts this type of ideology of the common
man wi t h the well-defined forensic ideologies of the conscious
ideologist.
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it is equally plausible to expect individuals to want to belong to an
organization such as an opposition party that is representative of an
attitudinal and ideological orientation similar to their own orienta4
tions.

Thus, the opposition NDP represents a political organization

that exists primarily in order to provide a structure for the articu
lation of political attitudes and interests differing from those of
the dominant DRP.

4
Louise Harned, "Authoritarian Attitudes and Party Activity,
in
Gordon DiRenzo, ed,, Personality and Politics (Garden City, New York:
Anchor Books, 1974) p. 131.
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